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ABSTRACT 
Several decades of research have established that video game experience is 
associated with differences in social information processing, visual-spatial 
processing, and cognitive control. Fewer studies have examined the relationship 
between video game experience and risky decision making outside of the gaming 
environment. The current set of studies examined the hypothesis that video game 
experience is associated with riskier decision making due to differential sensitivity to 
outcomes (i.e., reward, punishment). Study 1 was designed to explore the 
relationships between video game experience, risky decision making, and sensitivity 
to outcomes in a large sample of individuals. Study 2 was designed to investigate 
the association between individual differences in video game experience and the 
neural correlates of outcome sensitivity. Finally, Study 3 was designed to establish a 
causal relationship between immediate, brief experience with a video game and 
sensitivity to outcomes. The findings from the three studies indicate that video game 
experience is associated with differences in outcome sensitivity, but the relationship 
is complex and may depend on various factors, such as the genre of the video game 
and the presence of symptoms of pathological use. The data from the current set of 
studies should serve as a starting point for further research examining video games 
and risky decision making. 
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CHAPTER 1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
Computer and video games represent one of the most pervasive forms of 
leisure activity in modern culture, being played in 72% of American households 
(Entertainment Software Association (ESA), 2012). A little more than half of video 
game players are male (58%), and male dominated genres of video games (e.g., 
action, sports, and shooter) make up over 50% of the annual sales in video games 
(The NDP Group, 2010). While the average gamer is between the age of 18 to 49 
years (ESA, 2012), approximately 88% of individuals’ ages 8 to 18 years report that 
they occasionally play video games and 23% report playing video games at least 
once per day (Gentile, 2009). 
Considering the prevalence of video game consumption in society, it is 
important to understand the impact of this medium on video game players. The 
scientific literature on video game effects has examined a number of affective and 
cognitive processes to date. For instance, the data provide ample evidence that 
some genres of video games increase aggression (Anderson, Gentile, & Buckley, 
2007; Anderson et al., 2010; Sestir & Bartholow, 2010; Bartholow, Sestir, & Davis, 
2005), benefit visual-spatial processing (Green, Li, & Bavelier, 2009; Li, Polat, 
Makous, & Bavelier, 2009), and produce various (usually negative) effects on 
executive functioning (Bailey, West, & Anderson, 2010; Mathews et al., 2005) and 
affective processing (Bailey, West, & Anderson, 2011; Kirsh & Mounts, 2007). These 
latter effects are particularly relevant given the impact of executive functioning and 
affective processing on the quality of decision making (Figner & Weber, 2011; 
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Weber & Johnson, 2009; Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999), suggesting there is reason to 
believe that video game use may be related to changes in decision making. 
Decision making is a crucial part of successfully achieving one’s goals in 
many scenarios, including those encountered in video games. The goals that are 
faced in a video game are not typically realistic and the actions required to achieve 
these goals in game may be detrimental if replicated outside of the video game 
environment (e.g., stealing a car to get to a job, shooting other players to make 
money). Because the goals of a video game are limited in scope, the strategies 
useful for completing those goals may also be limited. For example, to accomplish 
the main objectives in a typical first-person shooter video game (e.g., Call of Duty, 
Medal of Honor), rushing through the level engaging and terminating enemies as 
you encounter them is a more effective strategy than attempting to carefully 
maneuver through the environment to circumvent the opponents. Killing enemies 
often provides bonuses (e.g., points, money, weapon upgrades) and there is usually 
no benefit to avoiding encounters. In this way, video games may reward frequent 
use of a limited behavioral repertoire.  
Video games do frequently reward risky and impulsive behavior (Gentile & 
Gentile, 2008; Anderson & Carnagey, 2009), but the relationship between video 
games and decision-making has received relatively little attention even though it has 
the potential to impact the real-world behavior of video game players (Gentile & 
Gentile; Beullens, Roe, & Van den Bulck, 2011). In a recent meta-analysis of media 
effects on risk-taking, only six out of more than 80 studies examined the relationship 
between video games and risk-taking (Fischer, Greitemeyer, Kastenmuller, 
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Vogrincic, & Sauer, 2011). The findings indicated that racing video games increased 
risky driving behavior in the real world; however, this leaves open the question of 
how other genres of video games may be related to risky decision making.  
Genre is used to informally classify video games for marketing and research 
purposes (ESA, 2012). Classification within a genre is based largely upon the 
mechanics of game-play or how the player goes about completing the goals in the 
game (Lewis, McGuire, & Fox, 2007; Wolfe, 2000). Action video games are 
characterized by their fast-pace and continual updating of visual information. These 
games typically require players to locate and interact with targets in a complex visual 
scene (Green et al., 2009). Action video games need not contain violence (as for 
instance in Portal: Still Alive), but they frequently do (as in Unreal Tournament, 
Grand Theft Auto, Call of Duty). First-person shooters (FPS) may be considered a 
sub-category of action games. Action video games can be contrasted with the broad 
category of non-action video games, which may include several genres, such as 
strategy, racing, simulation, and puzzle. These genres may differ from action video 
games and each other in terms of visual complexity, speed of information 
processing, and violent content (Adams, 2010). Strategy video games, for instance, 
typically rely on deliberate planning of actions rather than quick reactions to events 
in the game (Wolf, 2000). 
There is some evidence to suggest that various genres of video games can 
produce differential effects on behavior. For example, action video games are 
negatively associated with executive function (Bailey et al., 2010; Mathews et al., 
2005), while strategy video games may improve executive processes (Basak, Boot, 
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Voss, & Kramer, 2008). Furthermore, non-action video games typically used as 
controls (e.g., Tetris) may in fact modify performance on tasks believed to only be 
influenced by action games (Bailey & West, 2012). The purpose of the current set of 
studies was to examine how exposure to video games is related to risky decision 
making. The goal of Study 1 was to explore the relationship between screen time, 
genre, pathological video game use (Gentile, 2009), and behavior on risky decision 
making tasks. To examine the effects of game genre, participants were classified as 
action (e.g., Unreal Tournament, Call of Duty), strategy (e.g., Starcraft, Rise of 
Nations), or simulation (e.g., Rock Band, The Sims) gamers, based on the video 
games they most frequently played. The goal of Study 2 was to investigate the 
association between individual differences in exposure to action video games, 
specifically first-person shooters, and the neural correlates of risky choices and 
sensitivity to feedback. The goal of Study 3 was to determine if short-term exposure 
to first-person shooters, racing, and puzzle video games primes differences in risky 
decision making. 
The remainder of the general introduction provides a brief overview of the 
video game literature, with particular attention to the research related to risk taking 
and pathological video game use, followed by an overview of the decision making 
literature related to risk and reinforcement learning. Finally, the goals of the current 
set of studies are described more fully before proceeding to the data for Study 1.  
Video Games 
 From their inception, video games have garnered a great deal of attention 
from researchers due to their widespread use and because they immerse individuals 
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in imaginary worlds, engaging in behaviors that may transcend game play to the 
natural environment (Anderson et al., 2010; Anderson, 2004; ESA, 2012). Research 
over the last few decades has demonstrated that video games influence a wide 
range of processes, from aggressive thoughts and behavior (Anderson & Carnagey, 
2009; Anderson et al., 2008) to the temporal and spatial components of vision 
(Green & Bavelier, 2003; Green et al., 2009) to cognitive control (Bailey et al., 2010; 
Basak et al., 2008).  The following section provides an overview of the primary areas 
of research on the effects of video games. I begin with the topic that has received 
the most attention (i.e., aggression and affective processing) and then proceed 
through the other areas in descending order of the amount of research that has been 
done. The last sub-sections address the limited amount of research that has been 
done in the areas of risk-taking and pathological gaming, which are the most 
relevant to the current studies. 
Mortal Kombat: Violent Video Games and Social Information Processing 
 Numerous studies have demonstrated the deleterious effects of violent video 
games on social information processing (Anderson et al., 2010). Long-term 
exposure to video games with violent content is associated with increased 
aggressive thoughts, feelings, and behaviors, and these effects have been 
demonstrated following short-term exposure to video games in the laboratory 
(Anderson et al., 2010; Anderson et al., 2007). Desensitization to violence 
immediately following exposure to video game violence has been demonstrated at 
the behavioral level as a decrease in the likelihood that players will notice and help a 
victim of violence (Bushman & Anderson, 2009) and at the physiological level as 
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less change in heart rate and a lower skin conductance response to violent images 
(Carnagey, Anderson, & Bushman, 2007). Additionally, individual differences in 
exposure to video game violence has been associated with attenuated amplitude of 
components of the event-related brain potentials (ERPs) when viewing violent, but 
not other negative, pictures (Bailey et al., 2011; Bartholow, Bushman, & Sestir, 
2006). Recent studies have also established a causal link between video game 
violence and decreased prosocial behavior (Anderson et al., 2010; Sestir & 
Bartholow, 2010; Bushman & Anderson, 2009). Finally, Kirsh and colleagues (Kirsh 
& Mounts, 2007; Kirsh, Mounts, & Olczak, 2006) have demonstrated that individuals 
with exposure (long-term and acute) to violent media are slower to identify neutral 
faces morphing to a happy expression and faster to identify neutral faces morphing 
to an angry expression, indicating they may be less sensitive to positive affect and 
have heightened sensitivity to negative affect. Taken together, these findings 
suggest that violent video games affect antisocial (e.g., aggression, desensitization), 
and prosocial (e.g., sensitivity to positive emotion, helping behavior) variables. 
How to Train Your Brain: Video Games and Visual-spatial Processing 
   A number of studies have demonstrated that experience with action video 
games has beneficial effects on visuospatial processing, ranging from visual acuity 
(Green & Bavelier, 2007) to visual search and object tracking (Green & Bavelier, 
2006). Positive correlations have been found between video game play and hand-
eye coordination (Griffith, Voloschin, Gibb, & Bailey, 1983), the efficiency of visual 
search (Castel, Pratt, & Drummond, 2005), and tracking in a flight simulator (Lintern 
& Kennedy, 1984). Additionally, research has demonstrated that performance on 
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many of these tasks can be improved by training on action video games (Dye, 
Green, & Bavalier, 2009; Green & Bavelier, 2007; Feng, Spence, & Pratt, 2007; 
Green & Bavelier, 2003; Greenfield, DeWinstanley, Kilpatrick, & Kaye, 1994; Dorval 
& Pepin, 1986). The basis of all of these effects appears to be an improvement in 
the integration of  information as a result of more efficient use of sensory information 
by action gamers (Green, Pouget, & Bavelier, 2010).  
The useful field of view task (UFOV; Edwards, Vance, Wadley, Cissell, 
Roenker, & Ball, 2005) represents one example of a measure used to test for 
individual differences in action video game experience and the effects of training on 
the spatial distribution of visual attention. The useful field of view is the area of the 
visual world from which information can be extracted without eye or head 
movements, and is particularly relevant in the context of training as performance on 
UFOV predicts driving performance in older adults (Clay, Wadley, Edwards, Roth, 
Roenker, & Ball, 2005). In this task, participants must identify the location of a target 
on the screen among distractors. Multiple studies have demonstrated improvements 
on the UFOV task after only 10 hours of action video game training compared to 10 
hours of training on a non-action video game (Green & Bavelier, 2006; Green & 
Bavelier, 2003) and this effect has been found to last for at least five months after 
training (Feng et al., 2007). In Studies 1 and 2 of the current paper, the UFOV task 
was used to verify that the self-reported action gamers were similar to the samples 
in previous individual difference studies and to examine whether other genres of 
video games were associated with differences in the UFOV. This task was chosen in 
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particular because of its reliability and validity as a predictor of real-world behavior 
(Clay et al.; Myers, Ball, Kalina, Roth, & Goode, 2000) 
Knockout: The Effects of Gaming on Executive Function 
  The effect of experience with action and violent video games on executive 
functions has been examined with various measures including the Stroop task 
(Bailey et al., 2010; Mathews et al., 2005), task switching paradigms (Boot, Kramer, 
Simons, Fabiani, & Gratton, 2008; Karle, Watter, & Shedden, 2010; Strobach, 
Frensch, & Schubert, 2010), and the N-back task (Basak et al., 2008; Boot et al., 
2008). Video game experience has been associated with increased interference in 
the Stroop task (Kronenberger et al., 2005) and the under recruitment of a brain 
network including the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and lateral prefrontal cortex 
(LPFC) that supports cognitive control (Mathews et al., 2005).  
Cognitive control, which allows one to maintain goal-directed information 
processing, can be divided broadly into proactive and reactive processes. Proactive 
processes maintain optimal information processing over time through moment-to-
moment adjustments of control settings, whereas reactive processes resolve conflict 
when competing responses are activated within a trial (Braver, Gray, & Burgess, 
2007). Bailey et al. (2010) found that action video game experience was associated 
with a reduction in proactive control and had little or no relationship with reactive 
control. The negative association between game experience and cognitive control is 
of particular concern because screen time can be relatively high during late 
childhood and adolescence, an important period for the development of executive 
functions (Diamond & Amso, 2008). In addition, similar neural structures are 
 9    
 
involved in cognitive control and decision making (Steinberg, 2008; Christopoulos, 
Tobler, Bossaerts, Dolan, & Schultz, 2009), so the effects of exposure to video 
games on these brain areas may have negative consequences for the efficacy of 
decision making as well. 
Need for Speed: Racing Video Games and Risk-Taking 
 The existing research examining video games and risky decision making has 
focused mainly on the effects of racing video games on attitudes towards and 
engagement in risky driving behaviors (e.g., speeding, fun riding, street racing; see 
Fischer et al., 2011). The data indicate that exposure to racing games is associated 
with increased positive attitudes towards risk-taking (Fischer, Kubitzki, Guter, & 
Frey, 2007), self-perception as a risky driver (Fischer et al., 2009), and the likelihood 
of risky driving among adolescents and adults, particularly males (Beullens et al., 
2011). Additionally, racing video games appear to be most attractive to individuals 
who already have an increased risk of car-related accidents and deaths (National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 2009). 
 Fischer et al. (2007, Study 1) surveyed 290 men and women on their driving 
behaviors and experience with several popular racing video games. They found that 
playing racing video games was positively correlated with self-reported competitive 
driving behavior (r = .49) and the need to show impressive road traffic behavior (r = 
.43), two indicators of risk-taking on the road. Furthermore, racing video game 
experience was negatively correlated with cautious road traffic behavior (r = -.21). 
Similarly, Beullens, Roe, and Van den Bulck (2008) found that among a large 
sample of adolescents, playing racing video games significantly predicted more 
 10    
 
positive attitudes towards fun riding (i.e., viewing driving as entertainment and thus 
engaged in riskier driving behaviors to increase the enjoyment), which was a 
significant predictor of intentions to engage in fun riding behavior. In a longitudinal 
study of attitudes towards risk-taking and real-world driving behavior, Beullens et al. 
(2011) found that having a history of playing racing video games significantly 
predicted greater prevalence of speeding two years later. This evidence supports the 
hypothesis that racing video games negatively impact attitudes towards and 
engagement in safe driving behavior. 
 To establish that the relationship demonstrated in the previous studies was 
causal, researchers have also attempted to prime risky attitudes and behaviors 
towards driving by having participants spend as little as 20 minutes playing a racing 
video game. In Study 2 of Fischer et al. (2007), participants played either a racing 
video game or a neutral game for 20 minutes and then responded to questions that 
assessed the accessibility of risk-related cognition as well as levels of excitement 
and arousal. Participants who played a racing game had greater accessibility of risk-
related thoughts and reported greater levels of excitement and arousal. Study 3 by 
these investigators replicated the increase in risk-promoting thoughts and 
demonstrated that participants who played a racing video game were more likely to 
engage in risky driving behaviors (Fischer et al., 2007). In this study, the Vienna 
Risk-taking Test (Schuhfried, 2006) was used to assess actual risky driving 
behaviors. In the test, participants view a real-life video of a risky driving technique 
and press a key to indicate when they would choose to abort the maneuver. 
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Participants who had just played a racing game had longer reaction times, indicating 
greater risk-taking.  
A similar set of experiments demonstrated that increases in the accessibility 
of risk-promoting thoughts and in actual risky driving behaviors following exposure to 
racing games is mediated by the individual’s perception of themself as a reckless 
driver (Fischer et al., 2009). Risky driving behavior was greater in men than women 
and when the participant was the player rather than the observer of a racing game. 
Importantly, increased risk-related thoughts and behaviors due to increased 
perception as a reckless driver were only found in participants who played a racing 
game that rewarded traffic violations. Playing a racing game that did not reward 
risky-driving behavior did not produce this effect (Fischer et al., 2009).  
Racing video games prime risk-related thoughts and risky driving behaviors, 
but it is as yet unclear whether different genres of video games can also prime risky 
decision making in other domains. Action video games have been associated with 
reliance on reactive rather than proactive cognitive control in the Stroop task, 
suggesting that action gamers tend to make their responses more in the moment 
rather than pre-planning their actions (Bailey et al., 2010). If this pattern extends to 
decision making in domains with serious consequences for the individual (e.g., 
gambling, substance use, social interactions), then it could be detrimental to their 
ability to avoid options that seem more appealing now, but have greater risks in the 
long-term. Therefore, one goal of the current study was to determine how action, 
strategy, and simulation video games are related to decision making under risk and 
uncertainty. 
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Mass Effect: Pathological Gaming and Attention 
 Recent work has revealed that between 8% and 9% of children and 
adolescent video game players meet criteria for pathological video game use 
(Gentile, 2009; Gentile et al., 2011). Pathological gamers play video games more 
frequently and for longer periods of time, skip other activities (e.g., homework, 
chores) to play video games, and report using video games to escape their problems 
more often than their peers. Several negative outcomes are associated with 
pathological video game use, including increased aggression, poor performance in 
school, elevated levels of depressive symptoms, and increased anxiety (Gentile et 
al., 2011). The relationship between pathological video game use and disorders of 
attention has been a topic of much speculation, but a relatively small body of 
literature has examined this association (Gentile et al., 2011; Swing, Gentile, 
Anderson, & Walsh, 2010; Gentile, 2009; Bioulac, Arfi, & Bouvard, 2008). 
 In the last decade, the United States has seen an increase in the number of 
children ages 4 to 17 years that are diagnosed with ADHD. In 2007, 9.5% of school-
age children were diagnosed with ADHD, reflecting a 22% increase in the number of 
cases from 2003 to 2007 (Center for Disease Control, 2010). While children and 
adolescents with ADHD frequently find it difficult to perform tasks that require 
sustained attention, they will spend hours watching television, surfing the Internet, 
and playing video games (Yoo et al., 2004; Weiss & Weiss, 2002). Studies have 
shown that ADHD is associated with an increased likelihood of developing 
substance abuse during adolescence (Tapert, Baratta, Abrantes, & Brown, 2002; 
Biederman, Wilens, Mick, Faraone, & Spencer, 1998; Wilens, Biederman, & Mick, 
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1998), and this may extend to behavioral addictions as well (Davis, 2001). For 
example, Internet addiction in 10 to 12 year olds is associated with a greater number 
of ADHD symptoms related to impulsivity and inattentiveness and children 
diagnosed with ADHD are more likely to display symptoms of Internet addiction (Yoo 
et al., 2004). Children with ADHD spend more of their time online playing games 
than on other online activities (e.g., shopping, reading, posting; Yoo et al.), a finding 
that may provide a link between Internet addiction and pathological video game use. 
 A few studies have explored the relationship between the amount of time 
spent playing video games and the number of ADHD symptoms. In a sample of 9th 
and 10th graders, Chan and Rabinowitz (2006) found that playing console or internet 
video games for more than one hour a day was positively correlated with scores on 
the inattention and ADHD subscales of the Connor’s Parent Rating scale. Similarly, 
in a sample of 6 to 16 year olds, 34% of children diagnosed with ADHD endorsed 
five or more statements on a Problem Video Game Playing (PVP) survey modeled 
after the DSM-IV criteria for pathological gambling and substance abuse, whereas 
none of the control children endorsed more than four statements (Bioulac et al., 
2008). These children had more severe symptoms of ADHD compared to children 
with the disorder who did not score over four on the PVP. While there were no 
differences in the number of hours ADHD and control children spent playing video 
games, parent reports revealed that hyperactive children were less likely to stop 
playing on their own and they responded to requests to stop playing with more 
negative behavior (e.g., arguing, whining, crying) than the control children. Children 
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diagnosed with ADHD are at a greater risk for problematic video game playing and 
exacerbation of their attention problems.  
 Recent work has shed light on the negative outcomes that may be associated 
with pathological video game use (Gentile, 2009, Gentile et al., 2011; Pawlikowski & 
Brand, 2011). In a large sample of 8 to 18 year olds, 8.5% of participants met criteria 
for pathological video game use (Gentile, 2009). Pathological gamers were twice as 
likely to be diagnosed with an attention deficit disorder. Similar results were reported 
in a longitudinal study of children and adolescents from Singapore, where again 
approximately 9% met criteria for pathological video game use (Gentile et al., 2011). 
Children who started out as pathological video game users and remained that way 
for the duration of the study reported more symptoms of ADHD than their peers who 
never met criteria for pathological video game use. The longitudinal design of the 
study allowed the researchers to investigate risk factors and outcomes of 
pathological gaming. Impulsivity represented one risk factor for pathological gaming 
at the beginning of the study and predicted increases in pathological gaming over 
time. Pathological game use also predicted greater impulsivity (Gentile, Swing, Lim, 
& Khoo, 2012; Gentile et al., 2009; Swing et al., 2010), suggesting that there may be 
a reciprocal relationship between these variables. 
Pawlikowski and Brand (2011) examined individual differences in excessive 
Internet gaming and performance on the Game of Dice task, a measure of risky 
decision making. In this task, the participant is instructed to make as much money as 
they could by guessing what number would come up when they rolled a 6-sided die 
over 18 trials. Each trial started with the participant selecting an alternative that had 
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a fixed probability (i.e., 1:6, 2:6, 3:6, or 4:6) and a fixed monetary value. Low 
probability options were associated with greater monetary value. Excessive Internet 
gamers selected low probability options more frequently than non-gamers, resulting 
in greater losses, displaying similar behavior as individuals with other impulse 
control disorders. The emerging pattern from the literature suggests that pathological 
gamers tend to be more impulsive and take more risks than their non-pathological 
peers. Given these findings, one goal of Study 1 was to examine how pathological 
gaming was related to risky decision making. 
Decision Making 
Among the plethora of decisions facing an individual each day, many entail 
potentially risky outcomes, the probability of which the individual may or may not 
explicitly know. In the rational model of decision making behavior, individuals choose 
the option with the greatest amount of expected utility, regardless of any other 
considerations; however, human beings very rarely make decisions in this way, and 
their decisions are in fact influenced by a multitude of factors (Metcalfe & Mischel, 
1999; Camerer & Weber, 1992; Weber, Blais, & Betz, 2002; Tversky, Slovic, & 
Kahneman, 1990; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) 
Prospect Theory (PT) describes actual decision making behavior when there is 
some risk or uncertainty about the outcomes. The main features of PT are 1) that the 
value function for possible outcomes is concave for gains, convex for losses, and 
steeper for losses than gains, and 2) small probabilities are over-weighted while 
medium and high probabilities are under-weighted (Kahneman & Tversky, 1992; 
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Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). In PT, humans do not always make the most rational 
decisions for a variety of reasons, which research has illuminated. 
In the decision making literature, risk refers to situations where the 
mathematical probabilities of the different possible outcomes are known by the 
individual; uncertainty refers to situations where the mathematical probabilities of the 
outcomes are unknown (Weber & Johnson, 2009). Generally speaking, decision 
makers are adverse to both risk and uncertainty (Camerer & Weber, 1992; 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1992, 1984), but there are situational and individual 
difference variables that influence the extent of the aversion (Metcalfe & Mischel, 
1999; Nosic & Weber, 2007). Similar factors influence decision making under 
uncertainty and under risk. The following sections describe research demonstrating 
the influence of situational variables on risky decision making, explore studies 
examining individual differences in risky decision making, and discuss work 
providing evidence for the neural processes underlying risky decision making and 
uncertainty.  
Situational Factors that Influence Risky Decision Making 
Research has revealed a number of situational variables that are associated 
with differences in risk aversion (Nosic & Weber, 2007; Read & Loewenstein, 1999; 
Tversky et al., 1990). For instance, research has demonstrated that framing a 
decision in terms of losses or gains produces different patterns of choices (Tversky 
et al., 1990; Kahneman & Tversky, 1984). When the choices are framed as gains, 
individuals are risk adverse; they will always choose a sure bet over a gamble. 
When the choices are framed as losses, individuals are more likely to take the 
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gamble, becoming risk seeking (Kahneman & Tversky, 1992; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1986). In other words, an individual faced with a decision may appear either risk 
adverse or risk seeking depending on the wording of the options. 
Another situational variable that can influence the extent to which individuals 
are risk-averse is their current affective state (Weber, 2006; Read & Loewenstein, 
1999; Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999).  Dual process models of decision making propose 
that decisions are influenced by a “cold” analytical system that enables planning, 
cognitive control, and regulation of behavior, and a “hot” experiential system that 
relies on past experience and emotional reaction or “gut” feeling (Weber & Johnson, 
2009; Stanovich & West, 1998; Kahneman, 2003). Both systems are usually at work 
in all of our decisions, but one system may more strongly influence decision making 
than the other (Weber & Johnson, 2009). “Hot” states result in greater risk taking 
than “cold” states, such that an individual may appear to be inconsistent in their risk-
preference or even as an irresponsible thrill-seeker (Figner & Weber, 2011). 
 Domain and expertise are two other factors that account for some of the 
differences in preference for risk (Figner & Weber, 2011; Weber & Johnson, 2009). 
Research has found that risk taking in one domain was not necessarily a good 
predictor of risk taking in a different domain (Weber & Johnson, 2009; Nosic & 
Weber, 2007; Weber et al., 2002). Individuals have different appetites for risk 
depending on what they are making a decision about (e.g., social, financial, 
recreational). Individuals typically take more risks when they believe they are an 
expert in the domain (Hanoch, Johnson, & Wilke, 2006; Weber et al., 2002; Figner & 
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Weber, 2011), possibly because familiarity lowers the perceived risk of the options 
(Weber, 2006; Weber et al., 2002; Camerer & Weber, 1992).  
Taken together, the findings from these studies suggests that far from being a 
stable attribute, an individual’s aversion to risk fluctuates systematically across a 
number of situational variables. Attitude towards risk is not a general frame of 
reference from which an individual evaluates all of their decisions, but rather is part 
of a process in which risk is weighed within the current context (Figner & Weber, 
2011). Related to the current set of studies, it would be useful to determine if and 
when risk-taking in a video game transfers to risky decisions in other contexts (e.g., 
do racing video games only increase risky driving?).  
Individual Differences and Risky Decision Making 
Research has demonstrated that preference for risk varies based on 
individual differences such as sex (Byrnes, Miller, & Schafer, 1999), age (Figner, 
Mackinlay, Wilkening, & Weber, 2009), and substance (ab)use (Kim, Sohn, & Jeong, 
2011; Mitchell, 1999). These individual differences may be useful predictors of future 
risky decision making, and, in some cases, may provide information about 
commonalities that underlie risky decision making in general. The association 
between individual difference variables and risk taking is particularly relevant to the 
current set of studies which were undertaken to establish whether or not video game 
experience was associated with differences in risky decision making.  
Numerous studies have documented sex differences in risk attitudes and 
behavior (for review, see Byrnes et al., 1999). Men tend to have more positive 
attitudes towards risk and to engage in risky behaviors more frequently than women 
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(Hanoch et al., 2006; Weber et al., 2002). When sex and domain are considered 
together, the data indicate that women are more risk averse in finances and less risk 
averse in social situations than men (Figner & Weber, 2011). This would suggest 
that examining the interaction between situational and individual difference variables 
may offer a more complete picture of risky decision making.  
Age is another individual difference that accounts for changes in risky 
decision making. Adolescence is frequently linked to engagement in risky behaviors, 
such as reckless driving, illegal substance use, and unprotected sex; consistent with 
these perceptions, teenagers and young adults do take risks in these areas more 
frequently than children and older adults (Center for Disease Control and 
Prevention, 2011). In contrast, age differences are often not found in research using 
traditional tasks that involve monetary risk (Byrne et al., 1999). An explanation for 
this discrepancy may lie in the interaction between age and affect. In a recent study, 
two versions of a monetary reward task were developed to examine if the interaction 
between affect and age was associated with differential decision making (Figner et 
al., 2009). In a “cold” version of the task, adolescents did not differ from adults. In 
the “hot” version of the task, adolescents made riskier decisions resulting in less 
monetary gain compared to the adults. These data indicate that the greater risk-
taking seen in adolescence is likely a result of their inability to regulate their 
emotions causing them to engage in high risk behaviors in contexts that are 
emotionally charged (Figner et al.).  
Substance use (e.g., cigarettes, alcohol, illicit drugs) has also been linked to 
differences in risky decision making (Kim et al., 2011; Kirby, Petry, & Bickel, 1999; 
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Mitchell, 1999). Substance use can impact decision making in various ways, 
including poor executive function, differential sensitivity to positive and negative 
outcomes, and greater impulsivity. For example, insensitivity to negative outcomes 
was demonstrated in a sample of alcohol dependent patients using the Iowa 
Gambling Task (IGT; Kim et al., 2011). In the IGT, participants select cards from four 
different decks; selection from two of the decks would result in a net gain, while 
selection from the other two decks would result in a net loss (Bechara, Damasio, 
Damasio, & Anderson, 1994). Participants must learn which decks are “good” or 
“bad” from experience, and so this task demonstrates decision making under 
uncertainty. Alcohol dependent patients performed worse on this task overall, taking 
longer to learn from negative outcomes (i.e., continued selecting cards from the 
“bad” decks longer than the controls; Kim et al.). The same study found that alcohol 
dependent patients also take more risks on a monetary gambling task. Study 1 
utilized the IGT to determine if the same pattern of behavior would emerge in 
pathological gamers. 
The effects of nicotine on impulsivity have been studied extensively using the 
temporal discounting task (e.g., Ohmura, Takahashi, & Kitamura, 2005; Mitchell, 
1999). In temporal discounting, participants are offered a choice between two 
monetary rewards. They may choose a small reward that they can receive 
immediately or after a short delay or they can choose a large reward that they will 
not receive until a longer amount of time has passed (Loewenstein & Thaler, 1989; 
Read, 2004). Selecting the smaller, immediate reward can be interpreted as greater 
impulsivity. Cigarette smokers have consistently been found to be more impulsive on 
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this task, selecting the small, immediate rewards more frequently than non-smokers 
(Reynolds, Richards, Horn, & Karraker, 2005; Mitchell, 1999). Additionally, the 
extent to which they discount delayed monetary gains has been correlated with their 
daily nicotine intake (Ohmura et al.; Reynolds et al.). These findings indicate that 
substance abuse is associated with impulsive selection of immediate rewards 
possibly as a result of weakened executive control over behavior. Participants in 
Study 1 performed the temporal discounting task to examine the relationship 
between pathological video game use and impulsivity. 
Neural Correlates of Risky Decision Making 
Brain areas involved in decision making can be roughly divided into two 
functional groups: deep brain structures, such as the limbic system and striatum, 
that are involved in acquiring the associations between stimuli as “good” or “bad” 
and invoking our primitive, affective responses to gains and losses; and higher brain 
structures in the frontal lobes that allow organization, planning, and control of our 
behavior in response to expected and unexpected outcomes (Bossaerts, Preuschoff, 
& Hsu, 2009; De Martino, Kumuran, Seymore, & Dolan, 2006; McClure, Ericson, 
Laibson, Loewenstein, & Cohen, 2007; McClure, Laibson, Loewenstein, & Cohen, 
2004; Christopoulos et al., 2009; Tobler, O’Doherty, Dolan, & Wolfram, 2007). This 
pattern is found for decision making under risk as well as uncertainty (Hsu, Bhatt, 
Adolphs, Tranel, & Camerer, 2005; Huettel, Stowe, Gordon, Warner, & Platt, 2006 ). 
Several lines of research have implicated the limbic system, striatum and 
cingulate cortex in risky decision making. The amygdala is typically involved in the 
initial affective response to a win or loss (De Martino et al., 2006). Striatal activity 
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has been found to increase as the value of the options increases (Christopoulos et 
al., 2009), and activity in the ventral striatum has been correlated with the subjective 
value of the reward (Kable & Glimcher, 2007), suggesting the striatum may be 
involved in coding the value of the reward. Similar to the ventral striatum, activity in 
the posterior cingulate cortex has been correlated with the participants’ subjective 
value of rewards more so than the objective amount of the reward, while activation in 
the anterior cingulate cortex has been associated with the amount of risk involved 
(Christopoulos et al., 2009). Dopamine release in the ventral striatum (Koepp et al., 
1998) and activation in the nucleus accumbens and amygdala (Hoeft, Watson, 
Kesler, Bettinger, & Reiss, 2008) have been found when participants play a video 
game, suggesting similar neural networks support performance in gambling tasks 
and video games.  
Activity in midbrain dopamine areas has been linked to processing outcomes 
in the temporal discounting task (McClure et al., 2004; McClure et al., 2007). Activity 
in the limbic and paralimbic systems was greater when the earlier reward was 
immediate (e.g., now versus 1 month), but not when both rewards were delayed 
(e.g., 1 day versus 1 month). When there was no immediate option available, the 
lateral prefrontal and parietal cortex were more active. Based upon the link between 
midbrain dopamine regions and video games (Koepp et al., 2008) and greater 
discounting in substance (ab)users (Mitchell, 1999), the temporal discounting task 
was used in Study 1 to examine the relationship between pathological gaming and 
preference for immediate versus delayed rewards. 
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Numerous studies have demonstrated the association between decision 
making and activity in regions of the frontal lobes. For example, activity in the inferior 
frontal gyrus has been associated with errors in predicting risk (d’Acremont, Lu, Li, 
Vander Linden, & Bechara, 2009) and decreases in activation in this region can 
predict the probability that the individual will select the risky option in a choice task. 
One interpretation of these data is that the inferior frontal gyrus may function as a 
marker for risk aversion or selection of the safer option (Christopoulos et al., 2009). 
Activity in the orbital-frontal cortex has also been found to decrease as participants 
display greater risk-seeking with losses (De Martino et al., 2006), therefore 
increased activation in these areas may indicate an increase in avoiding risk. Activity 
in the orbital-frontal cortex and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex has been observed 
during video game play (Hoeft et al., 2008), providing further evidence that 
performance in gambling tasks and video games is supported by similar neural 
networks. 
Lesion studies have indicated that damage to areas of the PFC disrupts 
learning in gambling tasks. In the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), controls show 
anticipatory skin-conductance responses (SCRs) to selection from “bad” decks, 
while patients with damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) do not 
(Bechara et al., 1996). The development of these anticipatory SCRs in healthy 
individuals occurs over the course of several selections from each deck. The authors 
propose that the vmPFC is involved in the process by which a neutral stimulus (e.g., 
deck of cards) becomes associated with “goodness” or “badness”, thus allowing the 
system to anticipate the outcome of a given behavior (e.g., selection from a deck). In 
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another study, patients with left ventrolateral and orbital lesions were more risk-
taking than controls (Floden, Alexander, Kubu, Katz, & Stuss, 2008), which the 
authors suggested was due to damage to these regions resulting in decreased 
sensitivity to negative outcomes.  
Repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) has also been used to 
demonstrate the involvement of the prefrontal cortex in risky decision making. 
Disruption of left lateral prefrontal cortex with rTMS was associated with selection of 
immediate rewards over delayed rewards in the temporal discounting task (Figner et 
al., 2010). In another study, participants performed the risk task while rTMS was 
used to disrupt activity in either the right or left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Knoch 
et al., 2006). In the risk task, participants were shown six boxes and instructed to 
select the color (i.e., pink or blue) of the box they believed had a winning token. The 
color with the smaller number of boxes (e.g., 5 pink and 1 blue) will have a lower 
chance of holding the winning token (e.g., 1/6 chance), but will be worth a greater 
number of points if correct. Participants have to decide on each trial whether to 
select the bigger, but riskier payoff or to play it safe. Disruption of the right, but not 
the left, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex increased the number of risky choices, 
suggesting that activity in the right prefrontal cortex may moderate the urge to take 
risks (Knoch et al.).  
The risk-taking tendencies of adolescents provide an example of how higher 
cortical areas and more primitive subcortical structures interact to influence decision 
making. The developmental course of the underlying neural circuitry for decision 
making described above has been used to explain the increased risk-taking 
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observed in adolescent behavior (Somerville, Jones, & Casey, 2010; Casey et al., 
2010; Galvan et al., 2006). Specifically, studies of brain development consistently 
find that adolescents have heightened activity in subcortical brain structures (e.g., 
the amygdala and nucleus accumbens) than children or adults. This is accompanied 
by less activation in prefrontal cortices (see Steinberg, 2008 for a review). These 
findings indicate that during adolescence, brain areas involved in reward circuitry are 
maturing, but the regions responsible for cognitive control will continue developing 
for a few more years, leaving teenagers with the unfortunate combination of greater 
sensitivity to rewards and less ability to control their impulses. The imbalance 
between the neural circuitry of reward and that of cognitive control in adolescence 
underlines the importance of illuminating the effects of video games on decision 
making so that we can understand their influence on the development of these brain 
structures.  
In summary, subcortical brain structures process the valuation of reward and 
risk and the affective responses associated with gains and losses (Bossaerts et al., 
2009), information that will be relayed to the prefrontal cortex which can exert 
cognitive control in service of avoiding unnecessary risks (Christopoulos et al., 2009; 
Tobler et al., 2007). Depending on the interaction between the affective response to 
a stimulus and cognitive control, an individual may be risk averse in one situation 
and risk-seeking in another, and systematic variation in these brain areas can 
account for individual differences in decision making across groups. 
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The Feedback-Related Negativity 
Reinforcement learning in risky decision making tasks has been examined 
using ERPs. The component most frequently associated with studies utilizing 
gambling tasks is the feedback-related negativity (FRN). The FRN is a negative 
deflection in the ERPs occurring between 200 and 300 ms after negative feedback is 
delivered, over the midline frontal-central region of the scalp (Eppinger, Kray, Mock, 
& Mecklinger, 2007; Holroyd, Hajcak, & Larsen, 2006; Holroyd & Coles, 2002; 
Gehring & Fencsik, 2001). The nature of the FRN is particularly relevant to Study 2, 
which examines the neural correlates of decision making in video game players and 
non-players using ERPs.  
Gambling tasks are frequently utilized to study the relationship between the 
amplitude of the FRN and reinforcement learning. Several studies have consistently 
demonstrated that the FRN is more negative to feedback indicating a loss than to 
feedback indicating a win (Hewig et al., 2007; Hajcak, Moser, Holroyd, & Simons, 
2005; Holroyd, Nieuwenhuis, Yeung, & Cohen, 2003). Less clear is how the FRN is 
influenced by the participant’s knowledge of the probability or their expectancy to 
win. One study found that when participants knew they were close to winning, the 
amplitude of the FRN to loss feedback was greater (Hewig et al., 2007). This may 
indicate that the FRN is sensitive to the probability of reinforcement, or at least the 
subjects’ perception of the probability they will win (Hewig et al., 2007). Holroyd et al. 
(2003) further demonstrated that when contingencies are manipulated so that 
participants come to expect a win, the amplitude of the FRN is greater for losses, but 
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when the contingencies are designed to build expectation of a loss, the amplitude of 
the FRN is decreased for losses. 
In contrast to Hewig et al. (2007) and Holroyd et al. (2003), Hajcak et al. 
(2005) fixed the feedback in a decision task, so that participants either expected to 
win or lose and found no difference in the amplitude of the FRN for expected and 
unexpected outcomes. Furthermore, Experiment 2 of the same study used a similar 
task as Holroyd et al. and still did not replicate previous findings. The conflicting 
results suggest that for expectancy to influence the FRN participants must have 
enough knowledge about the reward contingencies to form an expectancy, and if the 
expectancies are manipulated in the experiment it must be salient. 
Gambling paradigms are also useful for investigating the effects of reward 
magnitude on the FRN. Studies demonstrating no difference in the amplitude of the 
FRN for small and large losses or for neutral outcomes and losses seem to indicate 
that the neural generators that produce the FRN evaluate outcomes in a binary 
fashion, good versus bad (Hajcak, Moser, Holroyd, & Simons, 2006; Holroyd et al., 
2006). Other research indicates that the amplitude of the FRN is mediated by the 
relative value of the feedback (Holroyd, Larsen, & Cohen, 2004). Holroyd et al. 
(2004) created “even”, “win” and “lose” conditions in a forced-choice task in which 
participants selected one of three balloons to win points. In the “even” condition, one 
of the balloons contained a reward, another contained a loss, and the third balloon 
was empty. In the “win” condition, one balloon was empty, one balloon contained a 
small reward, and the last balloon contained a large reward. In the “lose” condition, 
one balloon was empty, one contained a small loss, and one contained a large loss. 
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The data revealed that the amplitude of the FRN for the empty balloon in the “win” 
condition was larger than that of the empty balloon in the lose condition (Holroyd et 
al., 2004). One explanation is that the empty balloon in the “win” condition was the 
worst possible outcome while in the lose condition an empty balloon was actually the 
best outcome, and the amplitude of the FRN may represent the weighting of good 
and bad outcomes based on the relative value of the feedback, not the objective 
value. There was no significant difference between the worst outcome and the 
middle feedback in any of the conditions, although worst and middle feedback both 
elicited larger FRNs than the best feedback (Holroyd et al.). In summary, these 
studies demonstrate that the amplitude of the FRN is greater for losses than wins 
(Hajcak et al., 2007), is greater for unexpected than expected outcomes (Holroyd et 
al., 2003), and is based on the weighting of good and bad outcomes relative to the 
other available options (Holroyd et al., 2004). Given this evidence, it appears that the 
FRN is an index of activity in neural generators involved in coding the “goodness” 
and “badness” of an event. 
Overview of the Current Studies 
 The goal of the current studies was to determine how exposure to video 
games, pathological gaming, and video game genre are related to decision making, 
impulsivity, and sensitivity to feedback in decision making tasks. This goal was 
motivated by findings from the few studies examining how racing video games relate 
to attitudes towards risk and actual driving behavior (Beullens et al., 2011; Fischer et 
al., 2009; Beullens et al., 2008; Fischer et al., 2007), and by work demonstrating that 
similar subcortical reward systems are activated during video game play (Hoeft et 
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al., 2008; Koepp et al., 1998) and decision making under risk (Christopoulos et al., 
2009; Kable & Glimcher, 2007). In addition, video game experience has been 
associated with variation in the use of proactive cognitive control (Bailey et al., 2010; 
Mathews et al., 2005) and affective processing (Bailey et al., 2011; Bartholow et al., 
2006), both of which may have implications for decision making. Based on these 
findings, one may reasonably hypothesize that exposure to video games may 
influence decision making outside of the gaming environment by altering reward 
processing. The current studies were designed to test this hypothesis by answering 
three related questions: 1) is there a relationship between video game experience 
and risky decision making (beyond racing video games and driving)?, 2) is video 
game experience associated with changes in the neural correlates of risky decision 
making?, and 3) can brief exposure to a video game alter risky decision making?  
Study 1 was designed to answer the first question by exploring the 
relationship between variables related to video game experience (e.g., screen time, 
pathological use, genre) and variables related to decision making (e.g., impulsivity, 
sensitivity to feedback, attitudes towards risk). Study 1 expands on previous work 
with racing video games (Beullens et al., 2011; Fischer et al., 2009; Beullens et al., 
2008; Fischer et al., 2007) by examining multiple genres of video games and 
attitudes towards risk in domains that are unrelated to the video game environment 
(e.g., what is the relationship between action video games and gambling?). While 
the design of Study 1 was not suitable for making strong causal statements 
regarding the direction of the relationship between video games and risky decision 
making, it allowed for the testing of a wide range of variables. This helped guide the 
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selection of tasks for Studies 2 and 3 by demonstrating the pattern of associations 
between the independent and dependent variables.  
Study 2 addressed the second question by examining the relationship 
between individual differences in exposure to action video games and the neural 
correlates of feedback sensitivity in tasks that require decision making under risk. 
Sensitivity to feedback (i.e., increased sensitivity to reward, decreased sensitivity to 
punishment) is one pathway through which the reinforcement contingencies utilized 
by video games may alter risky decision making. Study 2 was also designed to 
expand the generalizability of previous work that demonstrated a relationship 
between video game experience and sensitivity to positive and negative picture 
stimuli (Bailey et al., 2011; Bartholow et al., 2006).  
Finally, the third question was addressed in Study 3, which was designed to 
determine whether brief exposure to an action or racing video game could prime 
risk-taking and alter one’s sensitivity to feedback. Unlike Studies 1 and 2 which 
could only establish the existence of a relationship between the variables of interest, 
Study 3 was designed to provide evidence of a causal relationship between 
exposure to specific genres of video games and changes in decision making under 
risk. 
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CHAPTER 2. STUDY 1 
 Past research has demonstrated that experience with action video games 
(e.g., first-person shooters) is associated with decreased deployment of proactive 
cognitive control (Bailey et al., 2010; Kronenberger et al., 2005; Mathews et al., 
2005), differences in the experience and expression of positive and negative affect 
(Bailey et al., 2011; Kirsh & Mounts, 2007; Bartholow et al., 2006), and an increase 
in the number of ADHD symptoms, particularly among individuals who report more 
symptoms of pathological video game use (Gentile, 2009, Gentile et al., 2011; 
Pawlikowski & Brand, 2011). Affect and attention can influence decision making 
(Figner & Weber, 2011; Weber & Johnson, 2009; Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999), so it 
seems reasonable to hypothesize that exposure to action video games may have 
negative consequences for the efficacy of one’s judgment and decision making. 
Previous research with racing video games provides some evidence demonstrating 
that exposure to specific video games does influence real-world behavior related to 
decision making, with racing video games being associated with more risky driving 
behaviors among adolescents and young adults (Beullens et al., 2011; Fischer et al., 
2009).  
 Study 1 was designed to determine whether there were significant 
relationships between measures of experience with video games (i.e., number of 
hours played per week, genre of game played most often, and number of 
pathological gaming symptoms) and attitudes towards risky behavior, impulsivity, 
and performance on several decision making tasks. Due to the limited research on 
the effects of video games in the domain of decision making, Study 1 was 
 32    
 
Measure Variables Abbreviation
Media Usage Questionnaire Mean hours per week, Genre: 
Action, Strategy, Simulation
Hours, Action, Strat, Sim
Pathological Gaming Scale Number of symptoms PVP
Barratt Impulsivity Scale Total summed score BIS-11
Risk-attitudes Scale Average score RAS
Useful Field of View Accuracy UFOV
Iowa Gambling Task Number of good tokens 
selected, number of bad 
tokens selected
IGT
Stop-Signal Task Average stop signal delay, 
average stop signal reaction 
time
SSD, SSRT
Temporal Discounting Percentage of trials in which 
the earlier option was 
selected
Discount
Probabilistic Selection Task Percentage of test trials in 
which A was chosen/B was 
avoided
Select A, Avoid B
Risk Task Percentage of low risk 
selections, final score
Low Risk, Risk Rotal
Table 2.1. Dependent Variables Associated with Each Measure.
exploratory and utilized a mix of subjective and objective measures. The arsenal of 
questionnaires and experimental tasks that measure impulsivity and decision making 
under risk and uncertainty are summarized in Table 2.1.  The media usage 
questionnaire measured the average number of hours spent gaming per week and 
the most frequently played genre of video games. The pathological gaming scale 
was used to assess problem gaming. Risky decision making was measured by the 
risk-attitudes scale, the risk task, and the temporal discounting task. The 
probabilistic selection and Iowa Gambling tasks were used to assess decision 
making based on feedback (i.e., reinforcement learning). Impulsivity was measured 
with the Barrett Impulsivity Scale and the stop-signal task. Finally, the Useful Field of 
View task was used to demonstrate that the high action video game players in the 
current study were 
representative of the 
video game players in 
studies of visuospatial 
processing (Green & 
Bavelier, 2003, 2006, 
2007; Feng et al., 
2007).     
One goal of the 
current study was to 
examine whether or 
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not video game genres would have differential effects on decision making under risk. 
Video games can be classified in a number of ways, and the industry currently 
markets games under approximately 15 different genres (ESA, 2012). The current 
study limits its scope to three genres including action, strategy, and simulation 
games. This was motivated in part by previous work suggesting that these genres 
may not have the same consequences for visuospatial, cognitive, or affective 
information processing (Green et al., 2009; Bailey, 2009; Bailey & West, 2011; 
Basak et al., 2008).  
The characteristics common to these genres seemed likely to influence 
decision making in logical and predictable ways. In an action video game, the goals 
are provided by the game and the player is not required to endogenously maintain 
his attention; instead the game directs the player’s attention toward relevant stimuli. 
Reinforcement is immediate and negative consequences for failures are often minor 
(Rogers, 2010; Thompson, Berbank-Green, Cusworth, 2007). These features seem 
likely to encourage greater risk-taking, decreased sensitivity to negative outcomes, 
and preference for immediate reinforcement. In contrast, strategy video games 
require careful planning of one’s actions in order to achieve long-term goals, which 
can typically be achieved in a number of ways that are of the player’s choosing 
(Wolf, 2000). Failures are likely to be salient because of the greater time invested in 
achieving a goal (i.e., gratification is delayed), the personal responsibility for the 
effectiveness of the strategy, and the greater likelihood for real social consequences 
(e.g., other players become angry). These features would be expected to encourage 
greater risk-aversion, increased sensitivity to negative feedback, and increased 
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willingness to wait for larger rewards. Finally, simulation games frequently require 
planning and execution of motor sequences for multiple events over the course of a 
few minutes. Feedback can be immediate or delayed (e.g., feedback that you hit a 
note in Rock Band as you are playing versus the number of stars you receive at the 
end of the song) and goals can be set by the game, the player, or a combination of 
the two (e.g., reaching the top of a career in The Sims versus building your own 
city). The structure of a simulation game may encourage taking the middle ground 
between safe choices and high payoffs, with the possibility of toppling either way.  
The data were analyzed using three complementary methods to determine 
the nature of the relationships among the independent and dependent variables. 
Zero-order correlations were examined first to determine the simple relationships 
among the variables. Linear regression analyses were then conducted for each of 
the dependent variables to model the relationships with the independent variables 
and their interactions. Finally, a canonical correlation analysis was conducted to 
assess the relationship between the independent and dependent variables by 
extracting linear combinations among the two sets with the highest correlations. 
Based on the work of Gentile and colleagues (Gentile, 2009; Gentile et al., 2011), 
some tentative hypotheses about the effects of video game experience on decision 
making and impulsivity can be made. The average number of hours spent playing 
action video games per week should predict greater endorsement of riskier 
decisions and impulsivity, whereas playing strategy and simulation video games may 
not be associated with risky decision making. The number of pathological symptoms 
reported should predict risky and impulsive decision making. Finally, high action 
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gamers should be more accurate on the UFOV task than strategy, simulation, or 
non-gamers.   
Method 
Participants 
 Data were collected for 149 undergraduates (70 females) from Iowa State 
University ranging from 16 to 30 years of age. Due to an error in the software, data 
for the testing phase of the probabilistic selection task was lost for one participant. 
Informed consent was obtained from all participants and they received course credit 
for their participation. The study was approved by the Institutional Review Board. 
Materials and Design 
All questionnaires can be found in the Appendices. 
 Media Usage Questionnaire. The media usage questionnaire included three 
higher order questions. Two questions asked the individual to indicate the number of 
hours spent playing video games on a typical weekday (Question 1, Monday through 
Friday) or weekend (Question 2, Saturday and Sunday) for each of four time periods 
(6 am to noon, noon to 6 pm, 6 pm to midnight, and midnight to 6 am).  The third 
question asked the participant to indicate how often s/he plays each of 12 different 
genres of video games and what video game they spent the most time playing. The 
dependent variables used were the total number of hours spent playing video games 
per week (0 – 168) and classification as an action (i.e., first-person shooter), 
strategy, or simulation video game player (0 or 1) based on the genre of the video 
game they reported playing most often. The internal reliability was high for the 
 36    
 
number of hours played (coefficient  = .85) and for the amount of experience with 
genres of video games (coefficient  = .87).  
 Pathological Gaming Scale. A revised version of the pathological video 
gaming scale (PVP; Gentile, 2009; Gentile et al., 2011) was composed of 13-items 
that were based on the DSM-IV criteria for gambling addiction. Participants 
responded to each question by selecting “yes”, “no”, “sometimes”, or “don’t know”. 
The dependent variable was the number of questions to which they responded “yes” 
(1 – 13). The internal reliability for the current sample was acceptable (coefficient  
= .60).  
 Barratt Impulsiveness Scale. The Barratt Impulsiveness Scale Version 11 
(BIS-11; Patton, Stanford, & Barratt, 1995) was used to measure general impulsivity. 
The BIS-11 is comprised of 30 statements (e.g., I change hobbies; I plan for job 
security) and for each statement participants selected among the following options: 
“Rarely/Never”, “Occasionally”, “Often”, or “Almost always/Always”. For scoring, 
responses were coded numerically from 1 (rarely/never) to 4 (almost always/always) 
and summed to obtain a total score (0 – 120). Higher scores indicate greater levels 
of impulsivity. The internal reliability of the BIS in the current sample was high 
(coefficient  = .75). 
 Risk-attitudes Scale. A modified version of the Risk-attitudes Scale (RAS; 
Weber et al., 2002) included 20 statements from the ethical, gambling, and 
recreational subscales of the original measure. Participants indicated how likely or 
unlikely they would be to engage in the behavior described in each statement on a 
scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 5 (very likely). The dependent variable was the 
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average score across all items (1 – 5). Higher scores reflect more accepting 
attitudes towards risk. The internal reliability of the measure in the current sample 
was high (coefficient  = .76). 
Useful Field of View. The UFOV (Edwards et al., 2005) was used to measure 
selective visual attention to verify that participants with greater video game 
experience were similar to samples in other studies (Feng et al., 2007; Green & 
Bavelier, 2003). Participants located a target (triangle inside of a circle) among 
distractors (squares) in a briefly flashed display. On each trial a fixation square 
appeared for 20 ms. Targets were presented 10º (25 or 30 ms), 20º (25 or 30 ms), or 
30º (25 or 30 ms) away from fixation along one of eight radial arms. A mask for 
20ms followed the target and then participants were shown eight arms and indicated 
which one the target occurred on using the number key pad (1,2,3,4,6,7,8,9). The 
dependent variable was the overall accuracy for all eccentricities (coefficient  = 
.88). 
Iowa Gambling Task. In the IGT (Bechara et al., 1994) participants selected 
one of four tokens on each trial in order to earn points. Each token was associated 
with its own set of gains and losses. Participants were instructed to try to earn as 
many points as possible before the end of the task. The gain or loss for each token 
was predetermined for each of the 100 trials, such that selecting two of the tokens 
(circle or square) on most trials results in a net gain of points, while selecting the 
other two tokens (crystal or diamond) on most trials results in a net loss of points. 
The participants were not told which tokens were “good” and which were “bad”. After 
a token was selected, the participant was informed of the outcome (gain or loss) and 
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the total number of points they had earned. The tokens remained on the screen until 
the participant made a selection. The feedback was displayed for 1500 ms, and the 
response keys were ‘i’ (circle), ‘r’ (crystal), ‘c’ (square), and ‘m’ (diamond). The 
dependent variable was the number of times “bad” tokens were selected in the final 
20 trials. 
 Stop Signal Task. In the Stop Signal task (Verbruggen, Logan, & Stevens, 
2008), participants pressed a key to indicate whether they saw a circle (‘/’) or square 
(‘z’) on the screen. Each trial began with a fixation cross (+) for 250 ms followed by 
the stimulus, which remained on the screen until a response was made or for 1250 
ms if no response was detected. The interstimulus interval was 2000 ms regardless 
of reaction time. On 25% of trials an auditory stop signal followed onset of the 
stimulus with a variable stop signal delay (SSD). Participants were instructed to 
withhold their response on these trials. Initially, the SSD was set at 250 ms for all 
participants. The SSD was adjusted continuously during the task such that when a 
participant successfully inhibited a response the SSD was increased by 50 ms and 
when the participant was unsuccessful at inhibiting their response the SSD was 
decreased by 50 ms. Participants performed a practice block of 32 trials and three 
experimental blocks of 64 trials each. Participants had to wait 10 sec between each 
block. The dependent variables reported were the mean SSD and the stop-signal 
reaction time (SSRT). SSRT was obtained by subtracting the mean SSD from the 
mean RT.  
 Temporal Discounting. The temporal discounting task was similar to McClure, 
et al. (2004). Participants stated their preference in a series of choices between a 
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smaller amount of money received at an earlier time and a larger amount of money 
received at a later time. Participants were instructed to make each decision as if they 
would receive the option they selected. The first two choices were fixed to allow 
participants to learn how to respond in the task. The first choice required participants 
to select between the same amounts of money available at two different delays (e.g. 
$27.10 in 2 weeks vs. $27.10 in 1 month and 2 weeks) and the second choice 
required participants to select between two amounts of money in which the earlier 
amount is less than 1 percent of the later amount (e.g. $0.16 today vs. $34.04 in 1 
month and 2 weeks). The remaining 40 trials were constructed by combining one of 
the early delays (today, 2 weeks, or 1 month) with one of the later delays (2 weeks, 
1 month) and one of the following percent differences in amount of money: 1%, 3%, 
5%, 10%, 15%, 25%, 35%, 50%. The early amount of money was drawn randomly 
from a range of $5 to $40 and then the larger amount of money was set to the 
specified percent difference. All combinations of the early delays, late delays, and 
percent differences were used excluding those where the later delay would be more 
than 6 months after the experiment. The two options were displayed on either side of 
the screen with the smaller, earlier reward always presented on the left, and the 
options remained on the screen until a response was made. A yellow triangle 
located below each option turned red for 2000 ms after the response to indicate the 
selection. This was followed by a blank screen for 2000 ms and then the next choice 
appeared. Response keys were ‘v’ for the option on the left and ‘m’ for the option on 
the right. The dependent variable was the percentage of choices where the 
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earlier/smaller amount of money was selected. Selecting the earlier option more 
frequently indicates greater risk aversion. 
 Probabilistic Selection. In the probabilistic selection task (Frank, Seeberger, & 
O’Reilly, 2004), participants viewed three pairs of stimuli (AB, CD, EF) presented 
randomly and were instructed to select one of the stimuli in each pair. Probabilistic 
feedback was presented after each selection. In the first pair, selecting A led to 
positive feedback (i.e., “Correct!”) 80% of the time and selecting B led to negative 
feedback (i.e., “Incorrect”) 20% of the time. In the second pair, selecting C led to 
positive feedback 70% of the time, and in the third pair selecting E led to positive 
feedback 60% of the time. Participants performed three learning blocks of 60 trials 
(20 of each pair). In the final block, participants viewed all possible pairs of the six 
stimuli four times each and received no feedback about their choices. The stimuli 
were six Japanese Hiragana characters counterbalanced across the three feedback 
probabilities (i.e., AB, CD, EF). In all blocks, the figures remained on the screen until 
a response was made or until 4000 ms passed if no response was detected. In the 
learning blocks, feedback was displayed for 1500 ms. There was a 500 ms 
response-to-stimulus interval in the final block. Response keys were ‘v’ to select the 
figure on the left and ‘m’ to select the figure on the right. The dependent variables 
were the percentage of trials where A was select and B was avoided (i.e., not 
selected) in the final block. Greater selection of A than avoidance of B in the final 
block indicates learning based on positive rather than negative outcomes. Greater 
avoidance of B than selection of A in the final block indicates learning based on 
negative outcomes more than positive outcomes. 
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 Risk Task. In the risk task (Knoch et al., 2006), participants were presented 
with six boxes, each equally likely to contain a winning token. Some boxes were blue 
and others were pink. Participants were instructed to select the color of the box they 
believed to contain the winning token. If they chose correctly they received the 
number of points associated with the color they had selected, but if they were 
incorrect they lost that many points. Two variables were manipulated in this task. 
The level of risk refers to the ratio of pink and blue boxes which can be 5:1, 4:2, or 
3:3. For example, if there are 5 blue boxes and 1 pink box, then there is a 1 in 6 
chance that the pink box contains the winning token; therefore selecting pink would 
be riskier than selecting blue. The balance of reward refers to the number of points 
the colors are worth and can be 90:10, 80:20, 70:30, or 60:40. The color with fewer 
boxes was always worth the greater point value. In the example above, for instance, 
selecting pink would be worth 90 points while selecting blue would only be worth 10 
points. Participants completed 100 trials. Four of these were combinations of the 3:3 
level of risk with balance of reward and were not included in the analysis. The 
remaining 96 trials included all other possible combinations of level of risk, balance 
of reward, and color. The level of risk was displayed above the boxes on each trial 
and the balance of reward was displayed below. The box displays remained on the 
screen until the participant responded followed by feedback displaying the outcome 
and total points for 1500 ms. The response keys were ‘v’ to select pink and ‘m’ to 
select blue. The dependent variables for this measure were the total score at the 
end of the task and the percentage of low risk selections. 
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Procedure 
 All stimuli were presented using E-Prime 1.2 Software (Psychology Software 
Tools, Pittsburgh, PA) with the exception of the stop-signal task which was 
presented using the STOP-IT program 
(http://web.me.com/frederick.verbruggen/Site/STOP-IT.html). Participants signed the 
informed consent and completed the BIS-11, pathological gaming scale, Risk-
attitudes scale, and the media usage questionnaire. Half of the participants 
completed the tasks in the following order: temporal discounting, risk task, Iowa 
Gambling Task, Stop-Signal Task, and Probabilistic Selection; the other half of the 
participants completed the tasks in the reverse order. After the tasks were 
completed the participants were debriefed and thanked for their participation. The 
entire study took approximately 90 to 120 
minutes. 
Results 
 Sample Characteristics. The 
purpose of Study 1 was to ascertain the 
nature of the relationships between the 
measures of video game experience and 
the dependent variables (see Table 2.2 for 
means, standard deviations, and ranges 
of all measured variables). More than half 
of the sample (64%) reported playing 
M SD Range
Hours 20.63 25.38 0-139
Action -- -- 0-1
Strat -- -- 0-1
Sim -- -- 0-1
PVP 1.84 1.98 0-8
BIS-11 65.48 8.93 46-90
RAS 2.17 .55 1.05-3.75
UFOV .70 .25 .04-1.0
IGT 10.91 4.32 0-20
SSD 457.21 199.91 50-1043.8
SSRT 238.68 62.27 -64-569.6
Discount .73 .21 0-1.0
Select A .63 .21 0-1.0
Avoid B .65 .24 .06-1.0
Low Risk .83 .14 .30-1.0
Risk Total 318.52 698.51 -2360-1240
Table 2.2. Descriptive Statistics for All 
Independent and Dependent Variables.
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video games at least two hours per week. The average amount of time reported 
playing video games was 20.6 hours per week (SD = 25.4; 25th quartile = 0, 50th 
quartile = 13, 75th quartile = 34). Males reported playing more hours per week (M = 
28.2, SD = 21.89) than females (M = 12.1, SD = 26.5), t(147) = 4.06, p < .001. 
Pathological  video game use (i.e., responding “yes” to 6 or more of the statements 
on the PVP scale) was reported by 7.4% (males = 13.9%, females = 0%) of the 
sample, consistent with percentages found in children and adolescents (Gentile, 
2009; Gentile et al., 2011). The mean number of symptoms of pathological video 
game use reported in this sample was 1.8 (SD = 2). Males reported more symptoms 
of pathological video game use (M = 2.7, SD = 2.1) than females (M = .8, SD = 1.2), 
t(147) = 6.90, p < .001. 
Zero-order Correlations. The interactions between the video game measures 
are potentially interesting, so seven two-way interaction terms were computed; the 
number of hours spent playing video games per week (hours) with PVP and each of 
three genres of video games (i.e., action, strategy, and simulation games), and PVP 
with the three genres. Correlations among all of the variables are shown in Table 
2.3.  
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Action .12
Strat .05 -.32
Sim -.11 -.38 -.38
PVP .55 .20 .24 -.19
BIS-11 .18 .04 -.08 -.11 .13
RAS .11 .16 -.06 -.08 .13 .29
UFOV .16 .07 .04 .10 .28 -.05 .06
IGT .15 -.01 .08 -.13 .07 -.09 -.10 -.06
SSD -.10 -.06 -.11 .13 -.10 -.05 -.05 -.04 .02
SSRT .04 .04 .03 -.10 .01 .04 .06 -.18 .02 -.58
Discount .10 .17 -.01 -.11 .12 .13 -.01 .07 .06 .07 .003
Select A -.07 -.12 .14 .03 -.09 -.18 -.05 -.05 -.08 -.03 .01 -.07
Avoid B -.23 -.03 .17 -.01 -.04 -.26 -.19 .02 -.17 -.07 -.10 .09 .15
Low Risk -.29 -.16 .04 .01 -.16 -.10 .05 -.07 .06 .14 -.03 .04 -.02 .06
Risk Total -.29 -.10 -.06 .10 -.15 -.07 .02 .03 .02 .11 -.07 .01 -.05 .03 .80
Hours*PVP .79 .07 .18 -.12 .79 .18 .07 .21 .18 -.08 -.01 .11 -.02 -.12 -.26 -.27
Hours*Action .26 .83 -.27 -.32 .29 .07 .13 .11 .10 -.05 .04 .19 -.07 -.10 -.18 -.15 .19
Hours*Strat .39 -.21 .63 -.24 .46 -.04 .01 .16 .13 -.06 -.01 .05 -.01 .01 -.10 -.15 .59 -.17
Hours*Sim .53 -.17 -.16 .43 .13 -.01 -.07 .13 -.05 -.01 -.04 -.02 -.06 -.09 -.10 -.06 .29 -.14 -.10
PVP*Action .18 .78 -.25 -.30 .44 .06 .09 .14 .02 -.13 .06 .16 -.06 .01 -.12 -.07 .25 .81 -.16 -.13
PVP*Strat .26 -.22 .68 -.26 .62 -.01 -.01 .19 .13 -.06 .01 .07 -.07 -.004-.03 -.07 .52 -.18 .80 -.11 -.17
PVP*Sim .22 -.22 -.22 .58 .22 .13 .08 .17 -.10 .11 -.11 -.07 .04 .01 -.07 -.03 .23 -.19 -.14 .67 -.17 -.15
p < .05.
Table 2.3. Correlation Matrix with All Independent, Dependent, and Interaction Terms.
Hours was positively correlated with PVP (r = .55), PVP x action games (r = 
.18), PVP x strategy games (r = .26), and PVP x simulation games (r = .22). Action 
gaming was positively correlated with PVP (r = .20). Strategy gaming was positively 
correlated with PVP (r = .24) and hours x PVP (r = .18). Simulation games were 
negatively correlated with PVP (r = -.19). The number of pathological gaming 
symptoms was positively correlated with hours x action games (r = .29) and hours x 
strategy games (r = .46). These data indicate that as the number of hours spent 
gaming per week increases, so does the number of pathological symptoms. This 
relationship may be stronger for action and strategy games than for simulation 
games, which is not unsurprising given that these genres tend to be more popular 
among avid gamers (The NDP Group, 2010). 
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Self-reported impulsivity was positively correlated with hours (r = .18) and 
hours x PVP (r = .18), consistent with previous work (Gentile et al., 2011). Accuracy 
on the UFOV task was not significantly correlated with hours, action games, or hours 
x action games, which is inconsistent with previous work (Feng et al., 2007; Green et 
al., 2009). However, UFOV was positively correlated with PVP (r = .28), hours x PVP 
(r = .21), PVP x strategy games (r = .19), and PVP x simulation games (r = .17). That 
higher UFOV accuracy would be related to a greater number of pathological 
symptoms and the interaction between PVP and hours is interesting. This suggests 
that the relationship between gaming and performance on the UFOV may not be as 
straightforward as previously thought.  
The IGT was positively correlated with hours x PVP (r = .18), which would be 
consistent with the idea that heavy screen time and pathology would be related to 
decreased learning from negative outcomes (e.g., continued selection from the bad 
decks). Along the same lines, sensitivity to negative feedback in the probabilistic 
selection task was correlated with hours (r = -.23), with participants with fewer hours 
also being more sensitive to negative outcomes. Sensitivity to negative feedback 
was positively correlated with strategy games (r = .17), consistent with the tendency 
of this genre to encourage players to learn from mistakes and avoid making them in 
the future. Selection of the earlier, smaller reward in the temporal discounting task 
was positively correlated with action games (r = .17) and hours x action games (r = 
.18), consistent with the hypothesis that gaming can shift the individual’s focus to 
immediate rewards.  Finally, the percentage of low risk selections in the risk task 
was negatively correlated with hours (r = -.29), hours x PVP (r = -.26), and hours x 
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BIS-11 .08 1.94 -.004 -.11 -.12 -.19 -.18 .08 .23 3.03 .09 -.16 -.27 -.35 .18 .21 .32
RAS .06 1.53 -.15 .03 .01 -.06 -.05 .02 .14 1.62 -.08 -.06 -.03 -.21 -.05 -.05 .08
UFOV .21 6.14 -.32 -.01 -.003 .07 .20 .10 .24 3.33 -.02 -.02 -.03 -.04 .20 .17 .15
IGT .04 1.02 -.01 .13 -.07 -.01 -.12 -.02 .12 1.37 .18 .11 -.10 -.06 .05 .12 .04
SSD .03 .74 .04 -.06 -.03 -.07 .04 -.01 .07 .76 .003 .09 .03 -.03 -.05 .04 .07
SSRT .01 .26 .01 .04 .001 -.001 -.08 -.02 .03 .33 -.06 -.05 -.05 -.02 .04 .01 -.04
Discount .04 1.00 .03 .05 .11 .01 -.02 .05 .06 .61 .02 .06 -.01 .02 .02 .06 .01
Select A .05 1.11 .08 .002 .04 .16 .07 -.06 .11 1.31 .14 -.003 -.06 -.11 .01 -.06 .06
Avoid B .10 2.66 .06 -.23 .10 .19 .09 .06 .14 1.72 .04 -.07 .06 .04 .04 -.07 .03
Low Risk .12 3.16 .07 -.26 -.12 -.04 -.10 .05 .14 1.74 -.09 -.02 .02 .07 .08 .06 .02
Risk Total .10 2.64 .03 -.26 -.06 -.06 .01 .05 .13 1.54 -.10 -.04 .01 .07 .07 .06 .003
Note:  Sex and video game measures were entered into Model 1 and interactions between video game 
measures were entered in Model 2. Partial correlations are reported. p<.05. 
Table 2.4. Results of the Individual Regression Analysis for Each Dependent Variable.
Model 1 Model 2
action (r = -.18), consistent with greater risk taking among gamers. The total score in 
the risk task was also negatively correlated with hours (r = -.29) and hours x PVP (r 
= -.27), demonstrating that selecting the riskier option more frequently has a 
detrimental effect on overall gains for the high gamers, consistent with the 
hypothesis that video games would be associated with greater risk taking.     
Linear Regression Analyses. To determine whether the video game 
measures could explain self-reported impulsivity, attitudes towards risk, and 
performance on the tasks, a linear regression was conducted for each of the 
dependent variables with the predictors sex, hours, action, strategy, simulation, and 
PVP entered in Model 1 (Table 2.4a) and the seven interaction terms entered in 
Model 2 (Table 2.4b).  The data for the continuous variables were mean-centered in 
order to control for the effects of multicollinearity (Enders & Tofighi, 2007). When an 
interaction term was significant, the simple effects were tested to determine if there 
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R
2
F r p
Non-strat .06 2.38 .17
Strat .04 .42 .02
Non-sim .10 3.77 .28
Sim .40 9.18 -.31
Non-action .04 1.59 .06
Action .03 .34 .06
Non-strat .06 2.38 .06
Strat .04 .42 .19
Non-sim .10 3.77 -.05
Sim .40 9.18 .44
Non-sim .05 1.80 .19
Sim .31 6.15 -.36
Non-action .19 7.47 .05
Action .21 2.90 .27
Non-strat .12 4.92 .06
Strat .30 4.52 .13
Non-sim .19 7.47 .14
Sim .22 3.91 .08
No Symptoms .04 1.19 -.21
Hours < 6 Symptoms .03 .70 .07
> 6 Symptoms .29 1.64 .53
Table 2.5. Results of the Simple Effects Tests 
of Significant Interactions.
p < .05.
BIS-11
Hours
PVP
RAS Hours
PVPUFOV
IGT
were significant differences in the levels of one variable across the levels of the 
second variable. To simplify these analyses, the data were split into three groups for 
hours (0, < 30, > 30) and PVP (no symptoms, < 6, > 6).  
For the BIS-11, Model 1 did not explain a significant proportion of the 
variance; however, categorization as a strategy gamer predicted lower self-reported 
impulsivity (non-strat: M = 65.89, SD = 4.71; strat: M = 64.44, SD = 1.42), as did 
categorization as a simulation gamer (non-sim: M = 66.14, SD = 3.84; sim: M = 
64.21, SD = 4.70; Table 2.4a). This may reflect the greater importance of planning in 
these genres compared to others (e.g., action). Model 2 explained a significant 
proportion of the variance and hours x strategy, hours x simulation, PVP x action, 
PVP x strategy, and PVP x simulation predicted BIS-11 scores (Table 2.4b, 2.5).  
BIS-11 scores were higher for non-strategy 
gamers who played 30 or more hours per 
week than for strategy gamers who played 
the same amount (Figure 2.1a); participants 
who did not currently play video games, but 
identified as simulation gamers, scored higher 
on the BIS-11 than non-gaming, non-
simulation participants (Figure 2.1b). These 
data suggest that playing strategy video 
games may reduce impulsivity. In the 
interactions with PVP, action gamers had 
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higher BIS-11 scores than non-action gamers when they endorsed six or more 
pathological symptoms (Figure 2.2a), consistent with the hypothesis that 
pathological use of action video games is associated with greater impulsivity. BIS-11 
scores were lower for strategy gamers than non-strategy gamers when symptoms 
were present (Figure 2.2b), further supporting the idea that strategy games may in 
fact reduce self-reported levels of impulsivity. In contrast, simulation gamers scored 
lower than non-simulation gamers when no symptoms were endorsed (Figure 2.2c).  
For self-reported attitudes towards risk, neither of the models explained a 
significant proportion of the variance (Table 2.4). The interaction between hours and 
simulation games was a significant predictor of attitudes towards risk (Table 2.4b, 
2.5). Non-simulation gamers had slightly greater acceptance of risk than simulation 
gamers when playing video games for 30 or more hours a week (Figure 2.3a).  
For the UFOV task, Model 1 explained a significant proportion of the variance 
(Table 2.4a). Sex predicted UFOV accuracy (Males: M = .79, SD = .09; Females: M 
= .60, SD = .07) as did playing simulation games (non-sim: M = .68, SD = .13; sim: 
M = .74, SD = .11; Table 2.4a). Model 2 explained a significant proportion of the 
variance in UFOV accuracy (Table 2.4b) and PVP x action, PVP x strategy, and PVP 
x simulation significantly predicted UFOV accuracy (Table 2.5; Figure 2.4). When no 
symptoms of pathology were present, non-strategy gamers were more accurate than 
the strategy gamers (Figure 2.4b); and simulation gamers were more accurate than 
non-simulation gamers (Figure 2.4c).  
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These findings are surprising given the 
number of studies indicating that action 
video games benefit visuospatial 
processing. One would expect that action 
games would predict accuracy on the 
UFOV, but it does not. The interactions 
between PVP and genre are also 
surprising in that it appears that more 
symptoms predicts better performance on 
the UFOV, which seems counterintuitive 
as pathology is usually associated with 
worse performance.  
For the IGT, neither of the models 
explained a significant proportion of the variance. The interaction between hours and 
pathological symptoms was a significant predictor of selection from the “bad” decks 
(Table 2.4b, 2.5). Non-gamers with no symptoms selected from the “bad” decks 
more often than individuals who endorsed some symptoms (Figure 2.3b). Among 
participants who played 30 or fewer hours per week, those who endorsed less than 
six symptoms made fewer selections from the “bad” decks than those with no 
symptoms or those with six or more. Pathological gamers playing 30 or more hours 
per week selected from the “bad” decks significantly more than those without 
pathology. These data indicate that pathological gaming is associated with reduced 
sensitivity to negative outcomes. 
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For the stop-signal and temporal discounting tasks, neither of the models 
explained a significant proportion of the variance (Table 2.4). The video game 
measures and sex were not significant predictors of performance on these tasks. 
For the probabilistic selection task, neither model explained a significant 
proportion of the variance for selecting A (Table 2.4). Model 1 explained a significant 
proportion of the variance for avoiding B, with males (M = .64, SD = .07) being less 
likely to avoid B than females (M = .66, SD = .10) and strategy gamers (M = .72, SD 
= .08) being more likely to avoid B than non-strategy gamers (M = .63, SD = .08; 
Table 2.4a). The latter may reflect the fact that learning from errors in a strategy 
game is important for making more successful decisions in the future.  
For the risk task, Model 1explained a significant proportion of the variance in 
low risk selections and the total score at the end of the task (Table 2.4a). Individuals 
who did not play video games selected the low risk option on 86.26% (SD = .03) of 
the trials on average and finished the task with an average of 476 points (SD = 115). 
Individuals who play less than 30 hours per week selected the low risk option on an 
average of 84.40% (SD = .04) of the trials and finished the task with an average of 
416 points (SD = 141). Finally, individuals who play 30 hours or more per week 
selected the low risk option on an average of 77.72% (SD = .05) of the trials on 
average and completed the task with an average of 57 points (SD = 254). The 
amount of time spent playing video games predicted riskier choices and significantly 
worse performance on the task. 
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Dimension Canonical Correlation F df1 df2 p
1 0.62 1.7 117 955 .001
2 0.53 1.3 96 866 .03
3 0.44 1 77 775 .44
4 0.37 .82 60 681 .83
5 0.33 .65 45 585 .96
6 0.23 .44 32 485 .99
7 0.17 .34 21 380 .99
8 0.13 .26 12 266 .99
9 0.07 .14 5 134 .98
Table 2.6. Tests of Canonical Dimensions.
Canonical Correlations. The linear regression analysis revealed which of the 
independent variables could predict each of the dependent variables, separately. In 
order to test the relationship between the independent variables and the set of 
dependent variables, I conducted a canonical correlation analysis using hours, PVP, 
action, strategy, simulation, and the seven interaction terms as predictors of the 
other measures. This analysis evaluated the multivariate shared relationship 
between the two sets of variables (i.e., video game experience and decision 
making). Because the regression analyses revealed that the dependent variables for 
the stop-signal task were not correlated or predicted by any of the video game 
measures, SSD and SSRT were not included in the canonical correlation analysis. 
Tests of the dimensionality of the canonical correlations revealed nine dimensions, 
of which the first two were significant (Table 2.6). The first canonical dimension had 
a correlation of r = .62 
between the independent 
and dependent variable 
sets. The second canonical 
dimension had a correlation 
of r = .53 between the 
variable sets. These 
correlations indicate that 
the two sets of variables were highly correlated (Sherry & Henson, 2005).  
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1 2
Dependent Variables
BIS-11 .30 .74
RAS -.84 -.23
UFOV .56 .29
IGT .27 .26
Discount .02 -.14
Choose A .32 .17
Avoid B .34 .10
Low Risk .19 -.32
Risk Total .38 .59
Video Game Measures and Sex
Sex (1 = male, 2 = female) -.52 -.64
Hours .62 .33
Action .19 .38
Strat .07 -.23
Sim -.21 .19
PVP .52 .34
Hours*PVP .67 .21
Hours*Action .35 .36
Hours*Strat .27 .20
Hours*Sim .04 .28
PVP*Action .24 .27
PVP*Strat .23 .23
PVP*Sim .25 -.01
Canonical Dimension
Table 2.7. Canonical Correlations After 
Varimax Rotation of the Dependent 
Variables.
The canonical correlations between the variables (independent and 
dependent) and the dimensions indicate 
which variables have the most influence 
on the dimension and can be interpreted 
in a similar manner as the factor loadings 
in a factor analysis (Afifi, Clark, & May, 
2004). In a sample of 148, an r of .30 is 
significant at the .001 level, therefore 
variables where r > .30 were considered 
statistically significant (Table 2.7).  For 
the dependent variables, the first 
canonical dimension explained 11.12% of 
the variance and was most strongly 
related to RAS (r = -.84), UFOV (r = .56), 
Risk Total (r = .38), Avoid B (r = .34), 
Choose A (r = .32), and BIS-11 (r = .30). 
For the video game measures and sex, 
the first dimension explained 5.34% of 
the variance and was most strongly related to hours x PVP (r = .67), hours (r = .62), 
sex (r = -.53), PVP (r = .52), and hours x action (r = .35). This  dimension reflects the 
association between screen time and pathological gaming on risk-taking and 
sensitivity to negative and positive feedback. 
 54    
 
For the dependent variables, the second dimension explained 8.08% of the 
variance and was most strongly related to BIS-11 (r = .74), Risk Total (r = .59), and 
low risk selections (r = -.32). For the video game measures and sex, the second 
dimension explained 2.94% of the variance and was related to sex (r = -.64), action 
(r = .38), hours x action (r = .36), PVP (r = .34), and hours (r = .33). This dimension 
reflects the relationship between playing action video games and increases in 
impulsivity. 
Discussion 
 Study 1 was designed to examine the association between exposure to video 
games and various measures of risky decision making, impulsivity, and sensitivity to 
feedback. Consistent with previous work examining video game play and 
pathological video game use in children and adolescents (Gentile, 2009), 
approximately 7% of the current sample of young adults met criteria for pathological 
gaming. Males reported spending more time playing video games and more 
symptoms of pathological gaming than females. The number of hours spent playing 
video games per week was positively correlated with the number of pathological 
symptoms. In addition to replicating past research in this area (Gentile et al., 2011), 
the current study also found evidence for differential effects of genre and pathology 
on impulsivity, risk-taking, and reinforcement learning. 
Gaming and Impulsivity: Trigger Happy or Patience is a Virtue? 
The interaction between hours and PVP was positively correlated with BIS-II 
scores supporting the idea that pathological gaming is associated with greater 
impulsivity, as previously demonstrated (Gentile et al., 2011). The data also revealed 
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evidence that the genre of video game influenced the relationships among these 
variables. In the temporal discounting task, selection of smaller, earlier rewards was 
associated with playing action video games as well as the amount of time spent 
playing action video games, indicating greater impulsivity among heavy action 
gamers. The regression analyses further revealed that playing action, but not 
strategy or simulation, video games predicts greater impulsivity among participants 
who are pathological gamers. This was confirmed by the second dimension of the 
canonical correlation which represented the effect of hours, action games and 
pathology on impulsivity. These findings seem consistent with the cognitive control 
research, suggesting that high gamers rely more on reaction to the situation rather 
than planning (Bailey et al., 2010). 
In stark contrast to action games, playing strategy or simulation games 
predicted lower impulsivity. Interestingly, strategy gamers were less impulsive than 
non-strategy gamers when they played 30 or more hours a week and when they 
reported symptoms of pathology. It seems counterintuitive that individuals who are 
exposed to high doses of video games or display symptoms of pathological gaming 
would be less impulsive (Gentile et al., 2011), but the nature of strategy video 
games, unlike action games, encourages careful planning and deferred gratification. 
There are also more likely to be social repercussions for making hasty decisions in a 
strategy game, as successful completion of the goals often requires cooperation as 
a team. It is important to note that both strategy games and action games were 
positively correlated with PVP and the correlation between pathological symptoms 
and hours x strategy (r = .46) appeared to be higher than the correlation between 
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PVP and hours x action (r = .29), although this difference did not reach significance, 
t(146) = 1.53, p > .05.. This pattern suggests that strategy and action games are 
linked to pathology, but the consequences for impulsivity are reversed, likely due to 
the structure of the environment and the goals of the different genres.  
Gaming and Risk-Taking: High Stakes with No Gains 
In addition to greater impulsivity, gaming and action games in particular were 
linked to riskier decision making. In the risk task, the number of hours spent playing 
video games, the interaction between hours and PVP, and categorization as an 
action gamer were all negatively correlated with the percentage of low risk 
selections. Furthermore, hours predicted selecting the high-risk option more 
frequently. This was accompanied by a dramatic difference in the total points earned 
at the end of the task, indicating that the greater selection of risky options did not 
pay off in the end. The influence of hours, pathology and action games was further 
confirmed in the second dimension of the canonical correlation analysis. Taken 
together, these findings provide evidence that screen time, pathology, and action 
games influence an individual’s selection of risky options. This behavior apparently 
continues even though it may be detrimental to their overall performance as 
evidenced by the relationship between these variables and the total score; more 
hours also predicted lower total scores at the end of the task. 
Similarly, selection from the “bad” decks in the IGT was positively correlated 
with hours x PVP. Pathological gamers who played for 30 or more hours a week 
selected more frequently from the “bad” decks than individuals who played for as 
many hours but were not pathological. Continued selection from the “bad” decks 
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could indicate that the individuals failed to learn which decks were disadvantageous, 
that they were unable to change their strategies even though they knew the decks 
were worse overall, or they were more willing to risk larger losses for the (small) 
chance of receiving larger gains (Bechara, Tranel, Damasio, & Damasio , 1996). 
When considered with the findings from the risk task, it appears that gaming and 
pathology influence how likely the individual is to accept a higher risk of a large loss 
in favor of the smaller chance of a large gain. 
Gaming and Sensitivity to Outcomes: What Did We Learn? 
 The probabilistic selection task was developed to determine if an individual is 
more sensitive to positive, negative or both types of feedback in a probabilistic 
learning paradigm (Frank et al., 2004). The data revealed that increased screen time 
was associated with a decrease in avoiding B (i.e., learning from negative feedback), 
while there was no correlation between hours and selecting A (i.e., learning from 
positive feedback). However, strategy games were positively correlated and 
predicted avoidance of B, suggesting that individuals who identify as strategy 
gamers are more sensitive to negative feedback. As with impulsivity, the 
characteristics of strategy games may explain this relationship. Mistakes in a 
strategy game can have long-term consequences for achieving goals in the game 
because game play usually spans a longer time frame than an action video game. 
There is also the added social pressure of having other players depend on your 
performance. In other words, mistakes in a strategy video game can be costly, and 
one would benefit from paying attention to negative outcomes and learning to avoid 
those outcomes in the future.    
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Performance on the risk task and the IGT may also provide some evidence 
that gaming and pathology are associated with decreased sensitivity to negative 
outcomes. Screen time predicted worse performance on the risk task (e.g., lower 
total score) due to greater selection of risky options. Presumably, after several 
selections of the low chance risky options, the accruement of losses should be a 
deterrent for further selection of the risky option, but this was apparently not the 
case. Similarly, feedback over several trials of the IGT should result in decreased 
selection from the “bad” decks or else the points earned would begin to fall into the 
negative (which is indeed what happens). Pathology and screen time together 
predict greater selection from the “bad” decks well past the point at which the 
feedback was effective at decreasing selection from these decks among non-
pathological high gamers. 
As mentioned previously, two possible interpretations of performance on the 
IGT are failure to learn (possibly due to insensitivity to feedback) or a greater 
willingness to take high risks for the opportunity to receive large gains. Other 
findings in the current data provide evidence for both of these possibilities, and the 
two may not be mutually exclusive. Kim et al. (2011) demonstrated greater risk-
taking in a gambling task and slower learning on the IGT among patients suffering 
from alcohol abuse. It is possible that exposure to video games and pathological 
gaming may result in greater willingness to take risks because these individuals are 
slower to learn from negative outcomes. 
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Gaming and UFOV: Pathology Makes Perfect? 
Based on past research, it was predicted that action video games would be 
related to improved accuracy on the UFOV (Green & Bavelier, 2003; Feng et al., 
2007). In the current study, UFOV was not correlated with action games or with the 
number of hours spent playing action games. UFOV performance was positively 
correlated with PVP and hours x PVP. For strategy gamers, accuracy was 
decreased compared to non-strategy gamers when no pathological symptoms were 
present, which is consistent with the expectation that strategy games would not 
improve the useful field of view (Basak et al., 2008). Simulation gamers were more 
accurate than non-simulation gamers regardless of the number of pathological 
symptoms. Previous work has demonstrated the efficacy of flight simulation video 
games for testing performance in pilots (Gopher, Weil, & Bareket, 1994; Jones, 
Kennedy, & Bittner, 1981), suggesting that playing simulation games may influence 
performance on some visual and spatial tasks, likely depending on the specific 
content of the simulation games in question (e.g., Air Combat, The Sims, Rock 
Band). While there is not necessarily any reason to expect that pathological gaming 
would interfere with UFOV performance, it is interesting that as symptoms increase, 
so does accuracy, across all types of video games. That action games were not 
correlated with or predictive of UFOV performance does throw suspicion on the 
robustness of the effect of action video games on the spatial distribution of vision in 
this task (Boot et al., 2008; Feng et al., 2007; Green & Bavelier, 2003). 
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Summary 
 Study 1 was largely exploratory given the small number of studies that have 
examined the relationship between decision making under risk and video games 
(Beullens et al., 2011; Fischer et al., 2009; Pawlikowski & Brand, 2011). The data 
provided ample evidence that video games and pathology can predict impulsivity 
and risky decision making. Studies 2 and 3 were designed to extend these findings 
in two ways. In Study 2, the relationship between individual differences in gaming 
experience and pathology and the neural correlates of risky decision making was 
examined. Study 3 endeavored to determine whether exposure to video games 
primes changes in risk-taking and sensitivity to negative outcomes. 
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CHAPTER 3. STUDY 2  
 Study 1 found that video game experience was associated with greater risk 
taking and decreased sensitivity to negative feedback. The number of hours spent 
playing video games, the interaction between hours and pathological video game 
use, and categorization as an action gamer were negatively correlated with the 
percentage of low risk selections in the risk task, and increased screen time was 
also associated with a decrease in avoiding B in the probabilistic selection task and 
continued selection from the “bad” tokens in the IGT task, indicating reduced 
sensitivity to negative feedback. Study 2 was designed to extend the findings of 
Study 1 by examining the relationship between video game experience and the 
neural correlates of risky decision making and reinforcement learning using ERPs. 
Data were collected in two phases; in Phase 1, pilot data on a computerized version 
of blackjack were collected from individuals recruited as low or high action video 
game players. The preliminary data looked promising, so in Phase 2 additional 
participants completed the risk task and probabilistic selection task from Study 1 and 
blackjack while EEG was recorded.  
 In addition to the FRN that has been extensively studied in decision making 
and gambling tasks (Hajcak et al., 2005; Hewig et al., 2007; Holroyd et al., 2003), 
the current study also examined the association between video game experience 
and the P2w, or positivity effect for wins, the P3, and the slow wave. The P2w reflects 
sensitivity to unexpected rewards in gambling tasks (Hewig et al., 2010; Potts, 
Martin, Burton, & Montague, 2006) and reinforcement learning tasks (Holroyd & 
Coles, 2002) and has a similar topography as the FRN, but is a transient positivity. 
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The P3 component is related to evaluative processes or the orienting of attention to 
stimuli and has been recorded in various paradigms (Courchesne, 1978; Ito, Larsen, 
Smith, & Cacioppo, 1998; Johnson & Donchin, 1980). The P3 is sensitive to 
individual difference variables (Bartholow, 2010; Polich, 2007), including video game 
experience (Engelhardt, Bartholow, Kerr, & Bushman, 2011; Bartholow et al., 2006). 
The slow wave is typically observed over the lateral frontal and posterior regions of 
the scalp, and likely reflects the updating of task goals (Bailey et al., 2011; West & 
Travers, 2008). 
In the blackjack task, the data from Phases 1 and 2 were combined and the 
individuals recruited as gamers were subdivided based on the number of hours they 
reported playing video games per week. This was done in order to examine whether 
differences in amount of exposure (i.e., screen time) to video games was associated 
with differences in the ERPs. Losses were expected to elicit the FRN and I 
hypothesized that the P3 would be greater for losses than for wins. Slow wave 
activity that differentiated wins from losses was also expected. I hypothesized that 
the video game players would be less sensitive to negative outcomes as indexed by 
attenuation of the FRN, P3, and slow wave activity elicited by feedback indicating a 
loss.  
In Phase 2, high and low gamers completed the risk task and probabilistic 
selection task from Study 1, and the blackjack task from Phase 1 while ERPs were 
recorded. Given the novelty of using ERPs with these two tasks, the study was to 
some extent exploratory; however, it was hypothesized that the FRN would be 
sensitive to feedback in both tasks (i.e., greater amplitude for negative feedback), 
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and that the amplitude of the P3 would be sensitive to the level of risk and changes 
in the probability of correct feedback in the risk task and probabilistic selection, 
respectively (i.e., greater in amplitude for risky wins and low probability outcomes). 
Based on Study 1, I hypothesized that high gamers would be less sensitive to 
negative outcomes than low gamers and this would be represented by attenuation of 
the FRN and P3 in the high gamers. Additionally, unexpected positive feedback 
should elicit the P2w component. Participants also completed the UFOV task in order 
to demonstrate that the high gamers in the current study were similar to the action 
gamers in studies of visuospatial processing (Feng et al., 2007; Green & Bavelier, 
2003). 
Method 
Participants 
 Ninety-eight males from Iowa State University were recruited to participate in 
this study based on their responses to the media usage questionnaire which they 
completed twice; once at least 2 weeks prior to participation in the laboratory 
session as part of a larger screening exercise, and once at the end of the laboratory 
session. Individuals who reported spending two or fewer hours per week playing any 
genre of video game at the time of screening were recruited as low gamers. 
Individuals that reported spending ten or more hours per week playing video games 
and reported that they often or always played first-person shooter video games at 
the time of screening were recruited as high gamers.  
For the blackjack task, the data for seven participants were excluded from the 
analyses due to misunderstanding how to play (1), excessive artifact in the EEG 
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data (1), or a large (i.e., > 5 hours) increase or decrease in the number of hours 
reported playing video games per week between the initial screening and laboratory 
session (5), leaving 91 participants in the sample. Data were randomly selected from 
half of the 52 individuals recruited as low gamers to be included in the analyses of 
the blackjack task (M = 0 hours per week; see Bailey et al., 2011 for a similar 
approach). A median split was performed on the hours played per week for the 
gamers, creating a group of 20 moderate gamers (M = 10 hours per week, SD = 5) 
and 26 high gamers (M = 31 hours per week, SD = 12). The low gamers (M = 20.62, 
SD = 5.29), moderate gamers (M = 18.65, SD = .75), and high gamers (M = 19.5, 
SD = 1.75) were similar in years of age (F(2,71) = 1.97, p = .15) and in their 
distribution of handedness (low gamers, right = 21, ambidextrous = 3, left = 2; high 
gamers, right = 23, ambidextrous = 3; moderate gamers, right = 18, ambidextrous = 
2; 2(4, N = 72) = 3.71, p = .45; Oldfield, 1971). 
Fifty-two of the 98 participants (i.e., individuals recruited during Phase 2) 
completed the probabilistic selection task, the risk task, and UFOV. For these tasks, 
data from two participants were excluded due to poor task performance (1) or 
excessive artifact in the EEG data (1). The sample included 25 low gamers (M = .08 
hours per week, SD = .40) and 25 high gamers (M = 20.48 hours per week, SD = 
13.51). The low gamers (M = 20.92, SD = 5.42) and high gamers (M = 18.8, SD = 
.82) were not statistically different in years of age (F(1,48) = 3.75, p = .06) or in their 
distribution of handedness (low gamers, right = 22, ambidextrous = 3; high gamers, 
right = 23, ambidextrous = 2; 2(1, N = 50) = .22, p = .64; Oldfield, 1971).  
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For the risk task, participants who never chose the risky option were removed 
from the data prior to analysis in order to examine the influence of risk on the 
amplitude of the ERPs associated with wins and losses. This resulted in a sample of 
20 low gamers and 18 high gamers. Two additional low gamers were removed for 
having an average reaction time > 3 SDs above the mean, leaving 18 participants. 
Materials and Design 
 Questionnaires. The risk-attitudes scale (Weber et al., 2002) and media 
usage questionnaire were administered to assess risk taking behavior and video 
game usage, respectively. These measures were identical to Study 1. For the risk-
attitudes scale, internal reliability was high (coefficient  = .81). The media usage 
questionnaire was administered during a screening session and during the 
laboratory session. The internal reliability was good for the number of hours played 
per week (screening coefficient  = .82, laboratory session coefficient  = .82) and 
the test-retest reliability of this measure was high (r = .86). Participants in Phase 2 
also completed the BIS-11 (Patton et al., 1995) and the pathological gaming scale 
(Gentile et al., 2011; Gentile, 2009) to assess impulsivity and pathology, 
respectively. These measures were identical to Study 1. Internal reliability was good 
for the BIS-11 (coefficient  = .85). For the pathological gaming scale, internal 
reliability was low (coefficient  = .39).  
Tasks. The stimuli and design of the risk task, the probabilistic selection task, 
and UFOV (coefficient  = .91) were identical to Study 1, with the exception that 
EEG was recorded while participants completed the tasks. The dependent variables 
remained the same as Study 1 with the addition of the mean amplitude of the ERPs. 
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The blackjack game was programmed in OpenGL (Silicon Graphics, Inc., 
Sunnyvale, CA) and was designed to look as if the participant was sitting at a casino 
table across from a dealer. Participants were instructed to make as much money as 
they could by getting their cards to equal more than the dealer’s cards without going 
over 21. Participants were given $1000 at the start of the game. A round of play (i.e., 
“hand”) consisted of three stages: betting, dealing, and feedback. In the betting 
stage, the participant placed a bet between $50 and the total amount of money he 
currently held. In the dealing stage, the participant and dealer were dealt two cards. 
The participant then decided whether he would “hit” (receive another card) or if he 
would “stay” (keep the cards in hand). Feedback (i.e., “You win!”, “You Lose”, or 
“Push” – indicating a tie – and total money) was displayed after the participant 
selected to stay or if the participant’s cards equaled more than 21 (i.e., a “bust” or 
loss). To increase his bet and to “hit” participants pressed the “m” key and to 
decrease this bet or to “stay” participants pressed the “v” key. The spacebar was 
used to advance from the betting stage to the dealing stage and to advance from the 
feedback to the next hand. After instructions were given, participants practiced the 
game for 5 minutes. EEG data were recorded for 15 minutes of play. If the 
participant reached a balance of $0 before the end of that time, then the game was 
reset and he continued playing. The dependent variables were the amount of money 
the individual bet on the current trial conditionalized upon the outcome of the 
previous trial and the mean amplitude of the FRN and P3. The four possible 
outcomes of each hand are the player wins (win), the player loses to the dealer 
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(loss), the player loses because his cards total more than 21 (bust), or the player’s 
cards total the same as the dealer’s (tie). 
Procedure  
 The fitting of the electro-cap was briefly described to the participant when he 
arrived for the study. The participant gave informed consent and completed the 
Edinburgh Handedness Inventory, the risk-attitudes scale, and the media usage 
questionnaire. Participants in Phase 2 also completed the BIS-11 and pathological 
gaming scale at this time. After the cap was fitted, the participant was moved to the 
testing room and asked to sit comfortably in front of the computer monitor. 
Participants were asked to limit eye and head movements during recording. All 
participants played blackjack for 15 minutes. If the participant lost all of his money 
before 15 minutes thereby ending the current game, the researcher restarted the 
game with a $1000 balance. Phase 2 participants also completed the risk task, 
probabilistic selection task, and UFOV. Half of the participants completed the four 
tasks in the following order: risk task, UFOV, probabilistic selection, blackjack. The 
remaining participants completed the tasks in the reverse order. Following testing, 
participants were debriefed. The entire experiment took approximately 120 minutes.  
Electrophysiological Recording and Analysis 
 The electroencephalogram (EEG) (bandpass 0.02 – 150 Hz, digitized at 500 
Hz, gain 1000, 16-bit A/D conversion) was recorded from an array of 68 tin 
electrodes based on a modified 10-10 system using an Electro-cap (Electro-Cap 
International, Eaton, OH). Vertical and horizontal eye movements were recorded 
from electrodes placed beside and below the right and left eyes. During recording all 
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electrodes were referenced to electrode Cz, then re-referenced to an average 
reference for data analysis. A .1 to 12 Hz bandpass filter was applied to the data. 
Ocular artifacts associated with blinks and saccades were removed from the data 
using a covariance-based technique including empirically derived estimates of the 
EEG associated with artifact and artifact free data (Electromagnetic Source 
Estimation; Source-Signal Imaging, San Diego). For blackjack, measurements of 
mean voltage were taken from 300 to 325 ms (FRN: F1, F2, FCz, Fz), 475-525 ms 
(P3: CPz, Pz, CP1, CP2), and 800 to 1800 ms (slow wave: lateral frontal – FT9, F9, 
FT10, F10 or parietal – P3, Pz, P4). The mean voltage data were analyzed in a 
series of 3 (gamer status: low, moderate, high) x 4 (outcome: win, loss, bust, ties) x 
2, 3, or 4 (electrode) ANOVAs. The blackjack data were also analyzed using Partial 
Least Squares analysis (PLS; McIntosh & Lobaugh, 2004; Lobaugh, West, & 
McIntosh, 2001) which included data for 64 electrodes from 0 to 1000 ms after 
stimulus onset. The PLS analysis allows one to decompose the full time course and 
topography of the scalp recorded ERPs into a set of orthogonal latent variables that 
capture differences in mean amplitude between task conditions across time and 
space and is useful for identifying patterns of neural activity that are differentially 
sensitive to various aspects of the task (e.g., differential neural activity for busts and 
losses) and whether these patterns are similar across the groups (Bailey et al., 
2011). 
In the risk task, the FRN was measured from 300 to 400 ms after onset of the 
feedback at electrodes F1, Fz, F2, and FCz; the P2w was measured from 300 to 350 
ms after onset of the feedback at electrodes FC1, FCz, and FC2; the P3 was 
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measured from 400 to 600 ms after onset of the feedback at electrodes CPz and Pz. 
In the probabilistic selection task, the FRN was measured from 260 to 310 ms after 
onset of the feedback at electrode FCz and the P3 was measured from 350 to 450 
ms after onset of the feedback at electrodes P3, Pz, and P4. These measurements 
and electrodes were selected based on visual inspection of the full electrode array 
and differ slightly across tasks due to differences in timing, stimulus characteristics, 
and task demands. 
Results 
Psychometric Data 
Questionnaires. The low (M = 2.13, SD = .44), moderate (M = 2.20, SD = 
.57), and high (M = 2.32, SD = .33) gamers did not significantly differ in their 
attitudes towards risk-taking, F(2, 69) = 1.18, p = .31, p
2 = .03. The low (M = 65.12, 
SD = 11.19) and high (M = 61.24, SD = 8.18) gamers did not differ significantly on 
impulsivity, t(48) = .69, p = .5, or attitudes towards risk, t(48) = 1.40, p = .17 (low 
gamers: M = 2.28, SD = .44 ; high gamers: M = 2.19, SD = .51). High gamers (M = 
2.04, SD = 1.79) endorsed more symptoms of pathological video game use than low 
gamers (M = .60, SD = .76), t(48) =  -3.70, p = .001. 
UFOV. The UFOV task was included to verify that the high gamers recruited 
for this study were comparable to the action gamers described by Green and 
colleagues (2009, 2007, 2003). Accuracy was significantly higher for the high 
gamers (M = .87, SD = .09) than the low gamers (M = .77, SD = .20; t(48) = -2.33, p 
= .02, p
2 = .10), converging with the previous literature. 
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Bust Loss Win Tie
M 133.70 144.80 173.86 145.83
SD 77.46 76.43 117.24 114.76
M 105.55 108.44 140.49 141.95
SD 84.14 67.66 151.82 129.90
M 89.23 93.03 116.17 111.60
SD 37.97 42.86 60.88 55.83
Table 3.1. Average Amount of Bet ($) Based on the 
Outcome of the Previous Trial.
Low Gamers
Moderate Gamers
High Gamers
The Blackjack Task 
Frequency of Outcomes. The four possible outcomes did not occur with the 
same frequency, F(3, 207) = 295.64, p = .001, p
2 = .81. Ties (M = .08, SD = .03) 
occurred significantly less often than losses (M = .24, SD = .07), F(1, 69) = 315.83, p 
= .001, p
2 = .82. Busts (M = .30, SD = .07) occurred more frequently than losses, 
F(1, 69) = 12.93, p = .001, p
2 = .16. Wins (M = .40, SD = .04) occurred significantly 
more often than busts, F(1, 69) = 82.76, p = .001, p
2 = .55. The outcome x gamer 
status interaction was not 
significant, F < 1.0, p = 
.87, p
2 = .01, indicating 
that the frequency of the 
outcomes was not 
statistically different for 
low, moderate, and high 
gamers. 
Betting. The average amount of the bet on the current hand based on the 
outcome of the previous hand was examined to determine whether the participants 
varied their playing style based on outcome. The average betting amount for hands 
following each of the four outcomes was analyzed in a 3 (gamer status) x 4 
(outcome) ANOVA. The main effect of outcome was significant, F(3, 207) = 9.21, p = 
.001, p
2 = .12 (Table 3.1).  Post hoc comparisons revealed that the amount of the 
bet placed after a win was greater than after a bust, F(1,69) = 17.21, p = .001, p
2 = 
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.20, or after a loss, F(1,69) = 12.2, p = .001, p
2 = .15 (Bonferroni corrected, p = 
.008). None of the other comparisons were significant, F’s < 5.01, p’s > .03. The 
outcome x gamer status interaction was not significant, F < 1.0, p = .57, p
2 = .02. 
The results indicate that the participants varied betting based on previous outcomes, 
such that the amount of the current bet was higher after the player won a hand. 
Gamer status was not associated with differences in betting. 
Study 1 found that screen time predicted riskier choices which resulted in 
dramatically reduced final scores in the risk task. For blackjack, the total amount of 
money the participant had at the end of the 15 minutes was analyzed to determine 
whether a similar effect would be found in blackjack. Low (M = $-682.69, SD = 
$1665.95), moderate (M = $-825.00, SD = $1625.25), and high (M = $-84.62, SD = 
$1650.74) gamers did not differ significantly in how much money they ended the 
game with, F(2, 69) = 1.37, p = .26, p
2 = .04. The direction of the means indicates 
that the high gamers lost the least amount of money, while the moderate gamers lost 
the most money. This was not consistent with Study 1 and may indicate that video 
game experience and the payout of a gamble may not have a linear relationship. 
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ERP Data. Inspection of the grand-averaged waveforms revealed that the 
FRN was present over the frontal-central region of the scalp and was greater for 
busts than the other outcomes in the low, moderate, and high gamers (Figure 3.1). 
The P3 was observed over the central-parietal region of the scalp and was also 
larger for busts. The amplitude of the P3 appeared to be smaller for the high gamers 
compared to the low gamers (Figure 3.1). Slow wave activity over lateral frontal and 
parietal regions was greater for busts and appeared to be attenuated in the high 
gamers (Figure 3.2). For the FRN, the main effect of outcome was significant, F(3, 
207) = 26.70, p = .001, p
2 = .28. Post hoc analyses revealed that losses (M = .22 
V, SD = 2.79), wins (M = .65 V, SD = 2.33), and ties (M = -.02 V, SD = 2.93) 
were not significantly different, F(2, 138) = 2.41, p = .10, p
2 = .03, so data for these 
conditions were combined. The amplitude of the FRN was significantly greater for 
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M SD M SD M SD M SD
CPz 11.06 4.33 4.90 3.39 3.41 2.49 2.82 3.84
CP1 10.07 3.63 4.83 2.43 3.93 2.35 3.70 3.90
CP2 9.46 4.75 4.92 2.54 3.59 2.68 3.42 3.48
Pz 9.17 3.71 6.28 2.98 5.34 2.66 4.18 3.75
CPz 10.45 3.74 4.21 2.79 3.36 2.59 4.43 2.99
CP1 8.69 2.76 3.52 2.28 2.75 1.89 4.06 2.55
CP2 8.75 3.35 4.15 1.79 3.08 1.86 4.01 2.46
Pz 9.19 3.03 4.59 2.31 3.67 1.68 4.72 3.06
CPz 9.03 3.23 4.1 2.42 2.95 2.27 3.93 3.74
CP1 7.95 3.41 3.85 2.52 2.99 2.21 3.74 3.31
CP2 7.91 4.01 4.36 3.17 3.18 2.98 4.19 3.92
Pz 8.64 2.81 5.25 2.69 4.07 2.13 4.85 3.60
High Gamers
Table 3.2. Mean Amplitude (V) of the P3 for the Group x Outcome x 
Electrode Interaction.
Bust Loss Win Tie
Low Gamers
Moderate Gamers
busts (M = -2.24V, SD = 3.13) than for the other conditions (M = .29 V, SD = 
2.28), F(1, 69) = 48.73, p = .001, p
2 = .41. The main effect of and interactions with 
gamer status were not significant, F’s < 1.82, p’s > .11.  
For the P3, the main effect of outcome was significant, F(3, 207) = 128.50, p 
= .001, p
2 = .65 (Figure 3.1). Further analysis revealed that the amplitude of the P3 
was not significantly different for wins (M = 3.5 V, SD = 2.08) and ties (M = 3.98 V, 
SD = 3.16), F(1, 69) = 2.45, p = .12, p
2 = .03. The difference in P3 amplitude for ties 
and losses (M = 4.62 V, SD = 2.31) was marginally significant, F(1, 69) = 3.35, p = 
.07, p
2 = .05. The amplitude of the P3 was significantly greater for busts (M = 9.19 
V, SD = 3.38) than for losses, F(1, 69) = 230.02, p = .001, p
2 = .77. The outcome x 
electrode x gamer status interaction was significant, F(18, 621) = 2.02, p = .03, p
2 = 
.06 (Table 3.2). Further analysis revealed that the outcome x gamer status 
interaction was marginally significant at electrode Pz, F(6, 207) = 2.08, p = .07, p
2 = 
.06, significant at 
electrode CPz, F(6, 
207) = 2.50, p = .04, 
p
2 = .07, and not 
significant at 
electrodes CP1 or 
CP2, F’s < 1.79, p’s > 
.12. At electrode Pz, 
the amplitude of the 
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P3 for wins was greater in the low gamers than the moderate gamers, t(44) = 2.46, p 
= .01. At electrode CPz, the amplitude of the P3 for wins, losses, and ties were 
significantly different from one another for the low gamers, F(2, 50) = 8.49, p = .002, 
p
2 = .25, but not for the moderate or high gamers, F’s < 2.55, p’s > .10. For the low 
gamers, losses elicited a significantly larger P3 than wins, F(1, 25) = 21.40, p = .001, 
p
2 = .46, and there was not a significant difference between wins and ties F < 1.0, p 
= .35. These data suggests that gamer status is not associated with differences in 
the sensitivity to busts (i.e., negative outcome as a result of the individual’s 
decision), but gaming may be related to reduction in the sensitivity to being beaten 
by an opponent (i.e., losses). Moderate amounts of video game experience may also 
be related to a reduction in sensitivity to wins. 
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Busts and losses were 
associated with slow wave 
activity over the lateral frontal, 
F(3, 207) = 6.94, p = .001, p
2 = 
.10, and parietal regions, F(3, 
207) = 16.76, p = .001, p
2 = .20, 
between approximately 600 to 
2000 milliseconds after the 
outcome of the hand (Figure 3.2). 
For the frontal slow wave the 
outcome x hemisphere 
interaction was significant, F(3, 
207) = 11.43, p = .001, p
2 = .14 (Table 3.3). Over the left hemisphere, the amplitude 
of the slow wave did not differ for ties and wins, F(1, 69) = 1.04, p = .31, p
2 = .02, 
and increased from wins to losses, F(1, 69) = 11.04, p = .001, p
2 = .14, and from 
losses to busts, F(1, 69) = 10.01, p = .002, p
2 = .13. This may reflect greater 
sensitivity to losing because the 
player chose to take another 
card (i.e., a bust) than from the 
dealer having a better hand. 
Over the right frontal region, the 
amplitude of the slow wave was not significantly different for ties, wins, or losses, F < 
Bust Loss Win Tie
M -2.75 -1.25 -0.21 0.15
SD 4.96 4.89 4.84 5.35
M -1.99 -2.41 -2.76 -2.93
SD 3.90 4.30 3.93 4.72
Table 3.3. Mean Amplitude (V) of the Outcome x 
Hemisphere Interaction for the Frontal Slow Wave.
Left Hemisphere
Right Hemisphere
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1.0, p = .39, p
2 = .01, and was less negative for busts than for the remaining 
conditions, F(1, 69) = 5.35, p = .02, p
2 = .10. Over the parietal region, slow wave 
activity increased from ties (M = .82 V, SD = 2.45) to wins (M = 1.39 V, SD = 
1.63), F(1, 69) = 5.75, p = .02, p
2 = .10, did not differ significantly for wins and 
losses (M = 1.49 V, SD = 1.91), F < 1.0, p = .58, p
2 = .01, and increased from 
losses to busts (M = 2.47 V, SD = 1.93), F(1, 69) = 16.38, p = .001, p
2 = .19. This 
indicates greater sensitivity to the busts than the other outcomes. There were no 
significant interactions with gamer status, F’s < 2.55, p’s > .10. 
PLS Analysis. The permutation test for the PLS analysis revealed four 
significant latent variables (p = .001, p = .001, p = .012, p = .02) that accounted for 
64.2%, 18.37%, 5.8%, and 4.52% of the crossblock covariance, respectively.  
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The first latent variable represented a contrast between busts and the 
remaining outcomes (Figure 
3.3). The brain score for busts 
was slightly smaller in the high 
gamers compared to the 
moderate and low gamers. The 
electrode saliences reflected 
three stable time points of 
neural activity. The first was a 
transient positivity over the 
frontal-central region from 300 
to 550 ms, reflecting the FRN. 
The second was a negativity 
over the central-parietal region 
of the scalp from around 300 to 
600 milliseconds after onset of 
the outcome, reflecting the P3. 
The third stable time point was 
a sustained positivity over the 
left frontal region and negativity 
over the parietal region from 
500 to 1000 milliseconds following the outcome. This latent variable appears to 
represent neural processing underlying a loss that the participant most likely caused 
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(e.g., takes another card resulting in 
a loss) and is consistent with the 
mean amplitude analyses. There 
was some evidence that the high 
gamers may be less sensitive to this 
type of loss compared to low and 
moderate gamers. 
The second latent variable 
represented a contrast between 
losses and the remaining outcomes, 
and this effect was smaller in the 
moderate gamers and slightly 
decreased in the high gamers 
relative to the low gamers (Figure 
3.4). The electrode saliences 
reflected two stable time points of 
neural activity. The first was a 
transient negativity over the frontal-
central region of the scalp between 
400 to 600 milliseconds after onset of the outcome, which reflects the FRN. The 
second stable time point was a sustained positivity over the left frontal region 
accompanied by negativity over the parietal region around 500 to 1000 milliseconds. 
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This latent variable appears to 
represent processing that is 
specific to losses, and this effect 
may be sensitive to moderate 
levels of video game exposure. 
The third latent variable 
appeared to represent neural 
processing related to wins, and 
was attenuated in the high 
gamers (Figure 3.5). The 
electrode saliences revealed three 
stable time points of neural 
activity. The first was a transient 
negativity over the frontal-central 
electrodes around 300 to 400 
milliseconds, representing the P2w 
(Hewig et al., 2010). The second 
was a sustained positivity over the 
left frontal region around 600 to 
800 milliseconds, followed by a 
sustained positivity over the parietal-occipital region of the scalp from 800 to 1000 
milliseconds. The meaning of this contrast is not immediately apparent. However, 
inspection of the grand average waveforms indicates that this effect actually 
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represents a smaller P2w and a 
quicker return to baseline for wins 
in the low and moderate gamers 
compared to the high gamers. 
Taken with the first latent variable, 
this may indicate that high doses 
of video game exposure are 
associated with decreased 
sensitivity to certain types of 
losses and increased sensitivity to 
rewards.  
The fourth latent variable 
represented a contrast between 
busts and ties in the low gamers. 
This effect was not present in the moderate and high gamers (Figure 3.6). The 
electrode saliences reflected fairly stable neural activity across the epoch over the 
frontal-central region of the scalp.  
Risk Task 
Behavioral Data. The low gamers (M = .83, SD = .13) did not choose the low 
risk option significantly more often than the high gamers (M = .86, SD = .10), t(34) = 
-.76, p = .45. The low gamers (M = 417, SD = 600) did not end the game with 
significantly more points than the high gamers (M = 500, SD = 496), t(34) = -.46, p = 
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.65. The hypothesis that high gamers would be more risk-taking and make fewer 
points than the low gamers was not supported by the data. 
ERP Data. Figure 3.7 shows the grand-averaged ERPs at select electrodes. 
The FRN appeared to be greater in amplitude for risky losses than for non-risky 
losses or either type of win in both low and high gamers. The amplitude of the P2w 
and P3 appeared to be greater for risky wins than for the other conditions. The data 
were analyzed in a set of 2 (gamer status: low, high) x 2 (outcome: win or lose) x 2 
(risk: risky or non-risky) x 2, 3, or 4 (electrode) ANOVAs (see Method section). The 
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FRN was greater in amplitude for losses (M = -2.64 V, SD = 3.85) than for wins (M 
= -1.32 V, SD = 3.82), F(1, 34) = 13.02, p = .001, p
2 = .28. The risk x outcome 
interaction was significant, F(1, 34) = 18.12, p = .001, p
2 = .35. Post hoc analyses 
revealed that non-risky losses (M = -1.89 V, SD = 3.27) did not differ significantly 
from non-risky wins (M = -1.87 V, SD = 3.22), F < 1, p = .93; the amplitude of the 
FRN was significantly greater for risky losses (M = -3.39 V, SD = 5.22) than for 
risky wins (M = -.77 V, SD = 5.23), F(1, 34) = 17.48, p = .001, p
2 = .34. None of 
the interactions with gamer status were significant, F’s < 1.0, p’s > .51. The data are 
consistent with past research indicated that the FRN is greater in amplitude for 
losses than wins (Hajcak et al., 2005, 2006) and is modulated by the probability of 
the outcome (Holroyd et al., 2003). Gamer status does not seem to influence the 
amplitude of the FRN. 
For the P2w, the main effect of outcome was significant, F(1, 34) = 5.40, p = 
.03, p
2 = .14, reflecting greater amplitude for wins (M = .49 V, SD = 3.12) than for 
losses (M = -.44 V, SD = 3.55). The risk x outcome interaction was significant, F(1, 
34) = 12.40, p = .001, p
2 = .27. Further analysis revealed that losses were not 
significantly different for non-risky (M = -.18 V, SD = 2.88) and risky (M = -.70 V, 
SD = 4.91) trials, F(1, 34) = .68, p = .42, p
2 = .02. For wins, the P2w was greater in 
amplitude on risky (M = 1.45 V, SD = 4.33) than non-risky trials (M = -.48 V, SD = 
3.00), F(1, 34) = 7.84, p = .01, p
2 = .19. None of the interactions with gamer status 
were significant, F’s < 1.0, p’s > .44. The data are consistent with past studies 
demonstrating the P2w is greater in amplitude for wins than losses, and is particularly 
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sensitive to unexpected wins (Hewig et al., 2010), and this does not appear to be 
influenced by gamer status. 
For the P3, the main effect of risk was significant, F(1, 34) = 17.15, p = .001, 
p
2 = .34, with the amplitude being greater for risky trials (M = 4.94 V, SD = 4.47) 
than for non-risky trials (M = 3.00 V, SD = 4.26). The risk x outcome interaction was 
also significant, F(1, 34) = 14.03, p = .001, p
2 = .29. Post hoc analyses revealed 
that for non-risky trials, the amplitude of the P3 was greater for losses (M = 3.77 V, 
SD = 4.66) than for wins (M = 2.24 V, SD = 4.16), F(1, 34) = 15.47, p = .001, p
2 = 
.31. In contrast, on risky trials, the P3 was greater in amplitude for wins (M = 5.85 
V, SD = 5.80) than for losses (M = 4.03 V, SD = 3.78), F(1, 34) = 7.65, p = .01, p
2 
= .18. This demonstrates that the P3 is sensitive to expectancy, being greater for the 
unexpected outcome on a given trial (i.e., on non-risky trials a loss is unexpected, 
but on risky trials a win is unexpected). None of the interactions with group were 
significant, F’s < 2.31, p’s > .14. 
Probabilistic Selection 
Behavioral Data. Sensitivity to positive and negative feedback was assessed 
by analyzing the proportion of trials on which A was selected or B was avoided 
during the test trials. The low gamers (M = .66, SD = .26) and high gamers (M = .70, 
SD = .20) did not significantly differ in their sensitivity to positive feedback, t(48) = -
.73, p = .47. The high gamers (M = .71, SD = .23) were more sensitive to negative 
feedback than the low gamers (M = .56, SD = .20), t(48) = -2.51, p = .02, in contrast 
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to the negative association found between hours and sensitivity to negative 
feedback in Study 1.  
ERP Data. The grand-averaged ERPs at select electrodes are shown in 
Figure 3.8. The FRN was greater in amplitude for incorrect trials than for correct 
trials and the difference between correct and incorrect trials appeared larger in the 
high gamers than the low gamers. The amplitude of the P3 appeared to be greater 
for correct than incorrect trials in the low gamers, and in the high gamers, this 
difference appeared to be attenuated. The data were analyzed in a 2 (gamer status) 
x 2 (outcome: correct or incorrect) x 3 (pair: AB, CD, EF) ANOVA for the FRN and a 
2 (gamer status) x 2 (outcome: correct or incorrect) x 3 (pair: AB, CD, EF) x 3 
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(electrode: P3, Pz, P4) ANOVA for the P3. As a refresher, the probability of correct 
and incorrect feedback varies in each pair. In the AB pair, A is correct 80% of the 
time, in the CD pair, C is correct 70% of the time, and in the EF pair, E is correct 
60% of the time.  
The amplitude of the FRN was greater for incorrect trials (M = 1.14 V, SD = 
2.80) than for correct trials (M = 2.98 V, SD = 2.93), F(1, 48) = 46.41, p = .0001, p
2 
= .49. The pair x feedback interaction was significant, F(2, 96) = 3.00, p = .05, p
2 = 
.10. Further analysis revealed that the FRN was greater in amplitude for incorrect 
trials in the EF pair 
(Figure 3.9), than for 
the AB or CD pairs, 
which may reflect 
greater uncertainty 
about the correct figure 
in the EF pair. The main 
effect of pair and the 
interactions with gamer 
status were not 
significant, F’s < 1.17, 
p’s > .31.   
For the P3, the main effect of pair was significant, F(2, 96) = 3.99, p = .02, p
2 
= .10. Further analysis revealed no difference in amplitude for the AB (M = .70 V, 
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SD = 2.86) and CD (M = .80 V, SD = 2.55) pairs, F(1, 48) < 1, p = .71, p
2 = .003. 
The amplitude of the P3 was greater for the EF pair (M = 1.17 V, SD = 2.53) than 
for the CD pair, F(2, 96) = 6.78, p = .01, p
2 = .12. As with the FRN, this likely 
reflects the added difficulty of learning about this pair given that the feedback is 
almost random. The gamer status x feedback interaction was significant, F(1, 48) = 
6.54, p = .01, p
2 = .12 (Figure 3.10). The amplitude of the P3 was greater for correct 
choices than for incorrect choices in the low gamers; the highs gamers displayed the 
opposite pattern, 
although the 
difference did not 
reach statistical 
significance in either 
group. The main 
effect of feedback 
and all other 
interactions with 
group were not 
significant, F’s < 1, 
p’s > .46. 
Discussion 
The goal of Study 2 was to examine the relationship between individual 
differences in exposure to action video games and the neural correlates of feedback 
sensitivity and cognitive control in tasks that require decision making under risk. 
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Participants completed the UFOV task in order to demonstrate that the high gamers 
in the current study were similar to the action gamers in studies of visuospatial 
processing (Green & Bavalier, 2003; Dye et al., 2009). I predicted that the high 
gamers would be more accurate on this task, and the data supported this 
hypothesis. In the blackjack task, I hypothesized that moderate to high levels of 
video game experience would be associated with attenuation of the FRN and P3 for 
busts and losses, which would indicate a reduction in sensitivity to negative 
outcomes. The amplitude of the P3 over the central-parietal region was attenuated in 
the moderate and high gamers relative to the low gamers, and the first and second 
latent variables of the PLS analysis provided further evidence of a reduction in 
sensitivity to negative outcomes among video game players. In the risk task, I 
hypothesized that the high gamers would engage in riskier behavior demonstrated 
by greater selection of the risky options, lower final scores, and attenuation of the 
FRN and P3 for losses. Gamer status was not associated with changes in any of 
these variables. Finally, in the probabilistic selection task I hypothesized that high 
gamers would be less sensitive to negative feedback than low gamers and this 
would be reflected in decreased avoidance of B and attenuation of the FRN and P3 
to negative feedback. The data actually revealed the opposite pattern, 
demonstrating increased sensitivity to negative feedback among high gamers in the 
behavioral and ERP data. 
Study 1 revealed that screen time was associated with less avoidance of B in 
the probabilistic selection task, reduced selection of the low risk options in the risk 
task, and continued selection from the “bad” decks in the IGT, all indicating reduced 
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sensitivity to negative outcomes. Consistent with this idea, the current study found 
that the neural response to negative outcomes (i.e., busts, losses) in the blackjack 
task was attenuated in moderate and high gamers, which reflects reduced sensitivity 
to these outcomes. A number of studies have demonstrated that violent content in 
certain genres of video games is associated with desensitization to violence 
(Engelhardt et al., 2011; Bailey et al., 2011; Bushman & Anderson, 2009; Bartholow 
et al., 2006), but violent content does not adequately explain why individuals 
exposed to first-person shooter video games would be less responsive to negative 
outcomes resulting from their own choices, particularly when those choices 
negatively impact their performance as in Study 1.  
The reinforcement schedule of a typical first-person shooter video game may 
provide some insight into why gamers are less sensitive to negative outcomes. 
Failure in a first-person shooter video game means dying which usually results in 
replaying that segment of the game. While the player may find this frustrating, it in 
no way limits their ability to successfully beat the game so long as they keep playing 
(Rogers, 2010; Thompson, Berbank-Green, Cusworth, 2007). Video games are an 
environment where failure has virtually no long-term consequences and thus little 
need for the individual to pay much attention to mistakes. Generalized to decision-
making outside of the game, it is not unsurprising that these individuals would be 
less sensitive to negative outcomes relative to non-gamers. 
The high gamers in the current study did not display riskier decision making in 
the risk task compared to the low gamers. The amplitude of the ERPs were sensitive 
to outcomes, particularly unexpected outcomes (e.g., winning when the riskier option 
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was chosen), but these effects were not moderated by gamer status. The current 
study recruited high gamers who played predominantly first-person shooter video 
games because these represent the action gamers used in other studies (Bailey et 
al., 2011, 2010; Green & Bavelier, 2003). The failure to find the expected differences 
between high and low gamers may speak to the importance of the interactions 
between screen time, pathology, and genre. Study 1 revealed an association 
between screen time and the interaction between screen time and number of 
pathological symptoms with performance in the risk task. Isolation of one genre in 
addition to limited numbers of pathological symptoms may reduce the predictive 
power of screen time. In fact, pathology may be a more important factor for 
understanding the consequences of gaming than hours or genre (or violent content) 
alone (Gentile et al., 2011; Gentile, 2009). Pathological video game use is a recent 
concept, so this is one fruitful avenue for future research.  
In the probabilistic selection task, there was no significant effect of gamer 
status on sensitivity to positive feedback, consistent with Study 1. In contrast to 
Study 1, the high gamers were significantly more likely to avoid B than the low 
gamers, suggesting that the gamers were more sensitive to negative feedback in 
later decision making. During the learning phase of the task, the amplitude of the P3 
was greater for incorrect than correct trials for the high gamers, providing further 
evidence of increased sensitivity to negative feedback. The latter finding is in direct 
conflict with the blackjack data in the current study, where individuals with more 
video game experience displayed reduced P3 amplitude to negative outcomes.  
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The reinforcement schedules in first-person shooter video games may again 
provide some explanation for the disparity between the blackjack and probabilistic 
selection data. Video games are structured environments with rules of gameplay that 
the individual must learn in order to be successful (Rogers, 2010). When a player 
picks up a new game or plays a particularly challenging one, he may find it difficult to 
learn the mechanics of the game resulting in frequent deaths and growing 
frustration. While he struggles to grasp the rules, negative feedback may be 
particularly salient (Gentile & Gentile, 2008; Thompson et al., 2007). Learning in the 
probabilistic selection task is slow, difficult, and frustrating (Frank et al., 2004), and it 
is exactly the type of environment in which action video game players may be the 
most sensitive to negative feedback. 
An important limitation of the current study was that individuals were recruited 
based on their prior experience with video games, so the data are correlational and 
cannot be used to establish a causal relationship between gaming and differential 
neural activity while making decisions under risk. The groups did not differ 
significantly on the risk-attitudes scale or BIS-11, but there remains the possibility 
that some unmeasured variable accounts for the differences found in the current 
dataset.  
The data for Study 2 provided mixed support for the hypothesis that gaming 
would be associated with risky behavior and reduced sensitivity to negative 
outcomes. The blackjack data indicated reduced sensitivity to negative feedback in 
gamers, while the probabilistic selection task indicated increased sensitivity to 
negative feedback among high gamers. The conflicting results emphasize the 
 91    
 
necessity for further research to understand the relationship between gaming and 
decision making. In particular, research that demonstrates a causal relationship 
between video game experience and changes in decision making or sensitivity to 
positive and negative outcomes is needed. Study 3 was designed to examine 
whether or not acute video game exposure could prime risky decision making and 
alter sensitivity to positive and negative feedback. 
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CHAPTER 4. STUDY 3  
 Study 1 established that video game experience, or screen time, predicted 
greater impulsivity, more positive attitudes towards risky behaviors, greater risk-
taking, and decreased sensitivity to negative feedback. In Study 2, individuals with 
high levels of video game experience were associated with decreased sensitivity to 
negative feedback in the blackjack task and increased sensitivity to negative 
feedback in the probabilistic selection task as indexed by changes in the amplitude 
of the P3 relative to individuals with little video game experience. The conflicting 
results emphasize the complexity of the relationship between video game 
experience and risky decision making. The previous two studies were not designed 
to determine the extent to which exposure to video games causes changes feedback 
sensitivity and decision making under risk. Gaming experience was not 
experimentally manipulated, and while gaming had some predictive power in Study 
1, there could easily be some unaccounted for variable that explains the findings. In 
order to determine causality, Study 3 was designed to investigate the effect of short-
term exposure to video games on performance in the risk task and the probabilistic 
selection task.  
Several studies have demonstrated short-term effects of video games on 
aggression (see Anderson et al., 2010 for review); recently, there has also been 
evidence that exposure to racing video games primed more positive 
attitudes/behavior towards risky driving (Fischer et al., 2007, 2009). Research 
examining video games and aggression usually have the participants play either a 
violent or nonviolent video game for 15 to 20 minutes and then complete a task that 
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measures physiological arousal toward violence (Carnagey et al., 2007), aggressive 
behavior (Anderson et al., 2008), or helping behavior (Bushman & Anderson, 2009). 
Regardless of the measure used, participants exposed to the violent video game 
display decreased physiological arousal to violence, increased aggressive behavior, 
and decreased likelihood of offering help to a victim of violence (Anderson et al., 
2010). These data suggest that even a very small amount of exposure to some 
genres of video games can prime changes in physiological and behavioral 
responses to violence. 
Recent work demonstrating short-term exposure to racing video games 
increases positive attitudes, thoughts, and behaviors related to risky driving (Fischer 
et al., 2007, 2009) are particularly relevant to Study 3. Participants who played a 
racing video game for 20 minutes had greater accessibility of risk-related thoughts, 
greater levels of excitement and arousal, and longer reaction times to stop a risky 
driving maneuver than participants who played a control video game. This data 
indicate that risk-taking in one genre of video game can transfer to similar behavior 
outside of the game, but the effects of other genres of video games or on other 
domains of risky decision making is unclear. For instance, action gamers may be 
more likely to respond to situations in the moment rather than pre-planning their 
actions (Bailey et al., 2010) and if transferred to decision making in domains with 
serious consequences for the individual (e.g., gambling, substance use, social 
interactions), then it could be detrimental to their ability to avoid options that seem 
more appealing now, but have greater risks in the long-term.   
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The goal of Study 3 was to apply the paradigm described above to examine 
short-term effects of video games on decision making, thus extending the findings of 
Study 1 by demonstrating a causal relationship between video game exposure and 
changes in risk-taking and sensitivity to feedback. As in Study 1 and 2, the risk task 
and the probabilistic selection task were used to examine risky decision making and 
sensitivity to feedback, respectively. Participants in the current study played a 
racing, first-person shooter, or puzzle video game for 20 minutes before completing 
the tasks. For the risk task, I hypothesized that individuals who played one of the 
racing or first-person shooter video games would select the non-risky options less 
often and have lower final scores than the individuals who played a puzzle game. In 
the probabilistic selection task, I hypothesized that racing and first-person shooter 
video games would prime less avoidance of B indicating reduced sensitivity to 
negative feedback relative to the puzzle video games. The games were not 
expected to have differential effects on selections of A (i.e., sensitivity to positive 
feedback).  
Method 
Participants 
 Two hundred and seventy-two undergraduate students (82 female) from Iowa 
State University between the ages of 18 and 33 years participated in the study. 
Students taking Introduction to Psychology, Social Psychology, and Developmental 
Psychology could sign up for the study online. Individuals were randomly assigned 
to play a video game representing one of three different genres (first-person shooter, 
89; racing, 93; puzzle, 90). The groups were not significantly different in age (F(2, 
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270) = 2.44, p = .09), sex (2(2, N = 272) = .37, p = .83), or amount of previous video 
game experience (F(2, 270) = 1.30, p = .27; see Table 4.1 for means). 
Materials and Design 
 Questionnaires. The media usage questionnaire was administered to assess 
video game experience (coefficient α = .77). Participants also completed the RAS 
(coefficient α = .84) and the BIS-11 (coefficient α = .79). These measures were 
identical to those used in Studies 1 and 2. A video game evaluation sheet was also 
administered to assess the participants’ perception of the video games on 14 
dimensions (e.g., violence, arousal, action; Appendix E; coefficient α = .78).   
 Video Games. The video games were chosen based on their use in previous 
research examining visuospatial processing (Feng et al., 2007; Green & Bavelier, 
2006), aggression (Sestir & Bartholow, 2010; Carnagey et al., 2007) and prosocial 
behavior (Bushman & Anderson, 2009), and attitudes towards risky driving. Two of 
the video games were chosen to represent the violent/first-person shooter genre 
(FPS; Unreal Tournament 3, Medal of Honor: Allied Assault). Unreal Tournament 3 
is a first-person shooter video game in which the player is tasked with killing 
computer opponents while trying to avoid being killed. Participants played the 
game’s “Deathmatch” mode against 5 computer opponents on the Arsenal map. The 
kill/death ratio was recorded at the end of the 20 minutes. Medal of Honor: Allied 
Assault is a first-person shooter video game where the player takes on the role of a 
lieutenant in the United States Army during World War II. The main objective of the 
first level is to terminate as many enemy soldiers as possible without being killed. 
The kill/death ratio was recorded at the end of the 20 minutes.  
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 In order to expand the findings of Fischer et al. (2007), two racing video 
games were included (Racing; Need for Speed: Hot Pursuit, Carmageddon: 
Carpocalypse Now). Need for Speed: Hot Pursuit was designed to provide players 
with cop versus racer chases. Participants played as a racer and tried to stay ahead 
of the police for the duration of the race. Their score and placement in the race were 
recorded after the 20 minutes. Carmageddon is a third-person driving game that 
allows players to control a vehicle to compete against computer opponents. The 
player can win by completing the track in the allotted time, disabling the other 
drivers, or killing all of the pedestrians in the level. Participants were instructed to 
gain as many points as possible and that the game awards more points for killing 
opponents and pedestrians. The high score was recorded after the game was 
played.  
 The remaining two video games were selected as nonviolent/nonaction 
control games (Puzzle; Ballance, Zuma) and represented the puzzle genre. In 
Ballance, players guide a ball through a floating maze without letting it fall. The 
mazes increase in difficulty and participants were instructed to complete as many as 
possible in the 20 minutes. In Zuma, players destroy colorful balls before they reach 
the end of a preset path by shooting balls of the same color at the path. For Ballance 
and Zuma, a score was recorded for each level of the game the participant was able 
to complete successfully by the end of the 20 minutes. 
 Tasks. The stimuli and design of the risk task and the probabilistic selection 
task were identical to Studies 1 and 2.  
 
 97    
 
M SD M SD M SD
Age 19.57 2.23 19.09 1.26 19.70 2.14
Hours 15.94 15.66 19.10 16.09 19.51 17.52
BIS-11 64.72 9.21 63.61 9.44 64.61 8.72
RAS 2.25 0.55 2.19 0.48 2.17 0.53
Males Females Males Females Males Females
Sex 66 27 60 29 64 26
Racing FPS Puzzle
Table 4.1. Psychometric Data for Study 3.
Procedure  
 All task stimuli were presented using the E-Prime 1.2 Software (Psychology 
Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA). Informed consent was obtained, and participants 
completed the media usage questionnaire, RAS, and BIS-11. Participants then 
played a video game for 20 minutes. At the end of that time, half of the participants 
performed the probabilistic selection task followed by the risk task, and the 
remaining participants completed the tasks in the opposite order. After the tasks 
were completed, participants completed the video game evaluation scale, were 
debriefed, and thanked for their participation. The entire study took approximately 50 
minutes. 
Results 
The goal of Study 3 was to prime risk taking and reduced sensitivity to 
negative feedback by exposing individuals to a first-person shooter or a racing video 
game for 20 minutes. FPS, Racing, and Puzzle groups did not differ significantly on 
attitudes towards risk, F(2, 270) = .59, p = .55, or impulsivity, F(2, 270) = .41, p = 
.67, measured before playing the game (Table 4.1). These measures were not 
correlated with any of the 
independent or dependent 
variables of interest, and 
where therefore not 
included in further analysis 
(Table 4.2). 
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Genre BIS-11 RAS Low Risk Risk Total Select A
BIS-11 -0.01
RAS -0.06 0.30
Low Risk 0.06 -0.13 -0.11
Risk Total 0.04 -0.09 -0.11 0.90
Select A -0.03 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.08
Avoid B -0.01 -0.11 0.07 0.02 0.00 -0.06
p < .05.
Table 4.2. Correlation Matrix with All Independent and Dependent Variables.
A MANOVA was conducted for the video game evaluation scale. The analysis 
revealed that the three video game genres differed on all 14 items (Table 4.3a). 
Rather than including each item as a covariate, principal components analysis (PCA) 
was performed on the scale. The initial eigenvalues revealed that the first 
component accounted for 49% of the variance, the second component accounted for 
15% of the variance, and the third component accounted for 9% of the variance. The 
remaining components had eigenvalues of less than 1. A three component solution 
explained 72% of the variance after varimax rotation. All of the items had primary 
component loadings over .60 (Table 4.3b). The majority of the items loaded on the 
first component that reflected excitement/arousal. Two of the items had primary 
loadings on the second component that reflected difficulty. The third component was 
also comprised of two items and reflected violence/action. The results of the 
analyses were similar when one, two, or three of the components were included as 
covariates. Given the small amount of variance explained by the second and third 
components, the analyses reported below use only the first component as a 
covariate. 
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 Risk Task. The dependent variables for the risk task were the percentage of 
trials where the low risk option was selected and the final score at the end of the 
task. The means for both of these variables were in the hypothesized direction, with 
Racing selecting the low risk options least often and ending the game with the 
fewest points, followed by FPS, then Puzzle (Figure 4.1). The covariates were not 
significant for either variable, F’s < 1.0, p’s > .85. The effect of video game genre on 
the proportion of trials on which the low risk option was selected was not significant, 
F(2, 269) = .83, p = 
.44, p
2 = .01 
(Figure 4.1a). The 
end score did not 
significantly differ 
across the genres, 
F(2, 269) = .55, p = 
a) Racing FPS Puzzle b)
M M M F* 1st Component 2nd Component 3rd Component
1. The game was action packed. 4.04 5.02 2.52 63.39 0.33 0.04 0.84
2. The game was entertaining. 4.01 4.80 5.13 11.04 0.89 -0.22 0.002
3. The game was exciting. 3.75 4.53 4.00 5.45 0.83 -0.08 0.28
4. The game was frustrating. 4.72 3.36 3.54 16.79 -0.001 0.85 -0.03
5. The game was fun. 3.73 4.64 5.11 19.61 0.86 -0.28 -0.11
6. The game was boring. 3.84 2.99 2.82 9.83 -0.71 0.29 -0.05
7. The game was violent. 4.22 4.82 1.19 158.45 -0.22 0.14 0.85
8. The game was difficult to play. 4.80 2.81 2.09 73.11 -0.08 0.82 0.23
9. The game was absorbing. 3.53 3.99 4.07 3.07 0.77 0.20 0.002
10. The game was arousing. 2.83 3.56 2.89 5.75 0.65 0.14 0.27
11. The game was enjoyable. 3.70 4.62 4.97 15.00 0.88 -0.24 -0.07
12. The game was involving. 3.68 4.28 4.36 4.85 0.84 0.08 0.03
13. The game was stimulating. 3.66 4.31 4.29 4.67 0.83 0.02 0.11
14. The game was addicting. 3.13 3.49 4.38 10.72 0.78 0.07 -0.16
*All tests significant at p < .05.
Component loading >.60.
Table 4.3. a) Mean Ratings on the Video Game Evaluation Scale b) PCA Item Loadings.
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.58, p
2 = .004 (Figure 4.1b), and the results did not differ significantly when the 
covariate was excluded. This indicates that playing a racing or FPS video game for 
20 minutes did not significantly increase risk-taking, although the means were in the 
hypothesized direction. 
 Probabilistic Selection. The dependent variables for the probabilistic selection 
task were the proportion of trials were A was selected or B was avoided during the 
test phase, reflecting sensitivity to positive and negative outcomes, respectively. The 
means were in the hypothesized direction with FPS being more sensitive to positive 
and less sensitive to negative outcomes (Figure 4.2). The covariates were not 
significant for either variable, F’s < 2.09, p’s > .15. The genres did not differ 
significantly on the 
selections of A, F(2, 269) = 
.15, p = .86, p
2 = .001, or 
avoidance of B, F(2, 269) = 
.60, p = .55, p
2 = .004. The 
results did not differ 
significantly when the 
covariate was excluded. The 
data did not support the 
hypothesis that playing a racing or FPS video game would prime reduced sensitivity 
to negative outcomes. 
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Discussion 
 The purpose of Study 3 was to demonstrate a causal link between short-term 
exposure to video games and risky decision making. It was hypothesized that racing 
and first-person shooter video games would prime riskier decisions and reduced 
sensitivity to negative feedback in comparison to puzzle video games. While the 
data generally trended in the hypothesized direction, there were no significant 
effects of video game on any of the dependent variables, even after controlling for 
differences in how engaging participants found the games.  
 The design of the current study was largely based on past research that 
indicated as little as 20 minutes of gaming could prime aggressive behavior 
(Anderson et al., 2010) and risky-driving behavior (Fischer et al., 2009). One 
difference between the current study and the studies on risky driving is the similarity 
between the video game and the task used to assess decision making. In Fischer et 
al., the participants played a racing video game and then performed the Vienna 
Driving test in which they watched a video of driving and pressed a button to stop 
the car in the video from executing a risky maneuver. The behavior assessed in the 
driving test was essentially the same behavior performed in the video game. In 
contrast, the current study exposed individuals to 20 minutes of three different 
genres of video games, none of which resembled the risk or probabilistic selection 
tasks. Although there is some evidence to suggest transfer of skill in other domains 
(Bailey & West, 2012; Dye et al., 2009), it is possible that for risky decision making, 
the behavior needs to be highly similar to the behaviors learned in the video game in 
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order to influence performance. In other words, the effect of gaming on decision 
making may be domain-specific. 
The current study may have failed to prime risky decision making because in 
most cases risk-aversion is the default behavior (Camerer & Weber, 1992; 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1992). In the current data from the risk task, over 5% of the 
participants never chose the risky option, and approximately 90% of the participants 
selected the non-risky option on the majority (> 60%) of the trials, demonstrating a 
clear aversion to taking risks. There are fairly well-defined variables that affect when 
people will be risk-seeking (Weber, 2006; Read & Loewenstein, 1999; Tversky et al., 
1990; Kahneman & Tversky, 1984). For instance, finding a behavior less aversive 
has been offered as one potential link between playing racing video games and 
riskier driving behavior (Fischer et al., 2007; Beullens et al., 2011), and short-term 
exposure to a racing video game does in fact decrease aversion to risky driving 
behavior and slow reaction times to stop risky driving maneuvers (Fischer et al., 
2007, 2009). However, the participants did eventually stop the maneuver. This may 
indicate that video game exposure prolongs the decision making process, which 
may or may not result in the individual choosing to take the risk. 
As discussed in Study 2, pathology and the interactions between pathology, 
screen time, and genre may be a more important factor than experience alone for 
determining how video games influence decision making. Pathological gamers do 
tend to be at a greater risk than non-pathological gamers for many negative 
outcomes (e.g., attention deficits, poor academic performance, more depressive 
symptoms; Gentile et al., 2011; Gentile, 2009). Greater need for reinforcement and 
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focus on short-term outcomes might be the underlying factors driving changes in 
sensitivity to reward and punishment found in some video game users (see Study 1 
and 2).  
Finally, it could simply be that video game experience does not cause 
decreased sensitivity to negative outcomes or greater risky decision making, but 
rather that people who are more impulsive or risk-seeking tend to play more video 
games because gaming allows them to take extreme risks and rewards them for 
impulsiveness without any of the pesky consequences they would suffer in real-life. 
Impulsiveness and attention-deficits are predictive of greater use of video games 
and worse outcomes for pathology (Gentile et al., 2011). On the other hand, studies 
have also shown that video game use predicts an increased number and severity of 
symptoms (Swing et al., 2009; Gentile, 2009; Gentile et al., 2012). The reciprocal 
relationship between impulsivity, attention deficits, and increased gaming may 
influence decision making in ways not yet understood, which future research will 
hopefully shed light on. 
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CHAPTER 5. GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The purpose of the current studies was to examine the association between 
video game experience and risky decision making. Study 1 established that screen 
time was related to differences in sensitivity to rewards, impulsivity and risk-taking; 
the data also indicated that pathological use and game genre may be important 
factors in determining how screen time relates to these variables. Study 2 revealed 
that individual differences in action video game experience were associated with 
differences in the neural correlates of processes related to the evaluation of positive 
and negative outcomes, and were not associated with differences in the initial 
(en)coding of the outcomes. Finally, Study 3 attempted to establish a causal 
relationship between video game experience and variation in risky decision making. 
While the data were consistent with my hypotheses, the differences between the 
genres of video games were not significant. Together, the data from these three 
studies lead to the suggestion that there is a relationship between video game 
experience and risky decision making; however, further research will be necessary 
to determine the causal direction of the relationship and expand upon our 
understanding of moderating variables. In the following pages, I discuss the 
implications of the current studies and describe possible directions for future 
research.  
Consistent with my hypotheses, Study 1 found that screen time was 
associated with increased impulsivity as measured by the BIS-11 and reduced 
sensitivity to negative feedback as measured by the probabilistic selection task and 
the risk task. As noted previously, reduced sensitivity to negative outcomes may 
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explain the continued selection of risky options among individuals with greater video 
game experience; as they are unlikely to use the feedback to guide their decisions if 
they are less sensitive to it (Bechara et al., 1994, 1996). This demonstrates that 
video game experience in general is associated with differences in risky decision 
making. The data revealed that some of the strongest associations involved risky 
decision making and the interactions between hours, genre, and pathological use. 
These relationships and their implications for future work on video games and risky 
decision making are explored below. 
Game Genre: You are What You Play 
Video game research has explored multiple genres of games, from fighting 
and adventure (Anderson et al., 2010), to first-person shooters and puzzles (Green 
et al., 2010), to real-time strategy (Basak et al., 2008). The General Learning Model 
(GLM) posits that repeated exposure to video games teaches individuals affective, 
behavioral, and cognitive scripts that may be applied to situations outside of the 
video game environment (Barlett & Anderson, 2012; Buckley & Anderson, 2006). In 
the GLM, each exposure to a video game can be thought of as a learning encounter 
in which the personal (e.g., cognition, affect, arousal) and situational (i.e., the 
surrounding environment) variables that the individual brings to the encounter 
interact with the content of the video game. Over multiple learning encounters, 
personality changes may occur. Consistent with the GLM, the data from the current 
set of studies indicates that video games may influence behavior in ways that reflect 
the game mechanics and reinforcement learning schedules typical of a given genre.  
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In Study 1, action video games (i.e., first-person shooters) were associated 
with greater impulsivity and riskier decision making than non-action games, and in 
Study 2 this genre were associated with decreased sensitivity to negative outcomes 
in the blackjack task. Overall success in a first-person shooter video game is only 
marginally hampered by death/incomplete mission objectives (e.g., save the 
hostages) because the player can restart the game at a previous point to correct 
their mistakes (Rogers, 2010; Thompson et al., 2007). Failure has virtually no long-
term consequences in a first-person shooter, allowing the player to ignore it after the 
initial frustration has passed. As predicted by the GLM (Buckley & Anderson, 2006), 
generalizing the behaviors reinforced in a first-person shooter to decision-making 
outside of the game is likely to encourage impulsivity and less sensitivity to negative 
outcomes. This tendency is also consistent with the reliance on reactive cognitive 
control, rather than proactive, demonstrated in action gamers (Bailey et al., 2010). 
In contrast to the findings of Study 1 and the blackjack task, Study 2 did not 
reveal group differences in the risk task, and revealed that action gamers were more 
sensitive to negative outcomes in the probabilistic selection task. This finding is 
close to what one might expect for strategy gamers, which was associated with 
lower impulsivity and greater sensitivity to negative outcomes in Study 1. Game 
mechanics and reinforcement learning schedules may provide an explanation for the 
differences observed for the two types of games. The nature of strategy video 
games, unlike action games, encourages careful planning and deferred gratification. 
Success is a culmination of all of the decisions made throughout the game, play 
usually spans a longer time frame than an action video game, and there are no re-
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starts (Rogers, 2010; Thompson et al., 2007). In addition, strategy games tend to be 
played with others, so there are social implications for failure (Bennerstedt, Ivarsson, 
& Linderoth, 2012). Mistakes in a strategy video game can be costly, and learning 
how to avoid negative outcomes is essential for success.  
Strategy video games are currently the most played genre (ESA, 2012), so it 
was difficult to recruit “pure” action gamers for Study 2. Compared to previous 
semesters where only 25% of gamers reported playing strategy games, in the 
current studies 45% of gamers reported playing games in this genre. Variation in the 
popularity of a particular genre is likely related to the release of highly anticipated 
video games. For example, DC Universe, an online strategy game, was released in 
January, 2011 (GameSpot, 2011) and has been free to play since November of the 
same year (Sony Online Entertainment, 2011). After the switch, the number of 
players went up 300% (PCGamer, 2011). Given the differential effects of action and 
strategy video games, it is difficult to tell what behavior would look like in a mixed 
sample. The importance of further investigation related to the additive or interactive 
effects of two or more game genres becomes evident when one considers that 
action and strategy video games represent two of the three best-selling game 
genres (ESA, 2012).  
Study 3 failed to demonstrate a causal effect of playing a racing or first-
person shooter video game on risky decision making, although the small mean 
differences were in the expected direction. Individuals were only exposed to a video 
game for 20 minutes, and none of the games resembled the risk task or probabilistic 
selection task. It is possible that the context of the decision needs to be highly 
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similar to the video game environment in order to influence risk-taking. Consistent 
with this idea, previous work using racing video games found differences in decision 
making that were specific to risky driving attitudes and behaviors (Buellens et al., 
2010; Fischer et al., 2009). The effect of gaming on decision making may be 
domain-specific, or differences in risky decision making may require longer exposure 
to take effect. Future research could address the latter issue in a training study using 
various different genres.  
Video Games and the Neural Correlates of Negative Outcomes 
Based upon the results of Study 1 it was not possible to determine at what 
point during the processing of consequences differential sensitivity to negative 
outcomes emerged. There are two possibilities that were considered given the ERP 
data from Study 2: 1) video game experience may influence the initial (en)coding of 
the outcome, or 2) video game experience may influence how the outcome is 
evaluated or categorized. The results of Study 2 suggest that gamer status was not 
associated with changes in the initial (en)coding of the outcome of a decision (FRN, 
P2w), but was associated with differences in the evaluative categorization of the 
outcomes (P3).  
In the blackjack task for example, the amplitude of the P3 was attenuated in 
the moderate and high gamers relative to the low gamers, and the first and second 
latent variables of the PLS analysis provided further evidence for a reduction in 
sensitivity to negative outcomes among video game players. This indicates that 
video game players encode losses, but negative outcomes may not be as 
motivationally significant to them in comparison to non-gamers (Bradley, 2009). 
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Reduced motivational significance of negative consequences provides an 
explanation for the riskier decision making found in Study 1.  
In contrast to the findings for the blackjack task, the amplitude of the P3 for 
negative feedback was greater for high gamers than low gamers in the probabilistic 
selection task. One reason for the difference could be the difficulty of learning the 
rules in the probabilistic selection task. In an action video game, negative feedback 
may be more salient while the player is learning how to play, and then less so once 
they are familiar with the rules and game mechanics (Gentile & Gentile, 2008; 
Thompson et al., 2007). If the high gamers had not learned to consistently 
discriminate between the figures by the time they were tested, they might appear 
more sensitive to the negative feedback than the low gamers. I am currently 
extracting a more sensitive measure of learning from this data that might support this 
explanation. 
Based on the ERP data for the blackjack task and probabilistic selection task, 
video game experience appears to be associated with differences in the evaluation 
of negative outcomes, rather than the initial coding of the outcome as good or bad. 
The differences in evaluative categorization of losses in the blackjack task and 
evidence that video game players are desensitized to violent images (Bailey et al., 
2011; Engelhardt et al., 2011; Bartholow et al., 2006) indicates that video game 
experience may be associated with a general reduction in the motivational relevance 
of negative stimuli. An exception to this rule may be cases where the negative 
stimuli are particularly relevant to task performance, such as the learning phase in 
the probabilistic selection task, the detection of angry faces in a target detection task 
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(Bailey & West, 2012), and the assessment of threat level in a picture rating task 
(Bailey et al., 2011). These data demonstrate the role of situational variables in the 
application of scripts learned in a video game, consistent with the predictions of the 
GLM (Buckley & Anderson, 2006). 
Pathological Gaming 
 In addition to screen time and game genre, pathological gaming emerged as 
an important factor in determining the relationship between gaming and risky 
decision making in Study 1, and may also have contributed to the failure to find 
significant group differences in Studies 2 and 3. Consistent with previous work 
(Gentile, 2009; Gentile et al., 2012; Gentile et al., 2011), the results of Study 1 
revealed that gamers who reported a greater number of pathological symptoms were 
more impulsive. Greater impulsivity would be consistent with the idea that gamers 
often rely on reacting to a situation when it occurs rather than planning their actions 
in advance (Bailey et al., 2010; Mathews et al., 2005). Study 2 found no difference in 
self-reported impulsivity between low and high gamers, although this may not be 
surprising given that only one of the high gamers met criteria for pathological 
gaming. Based on Study 1 and previous work (Gentile, 2009), the percentage of the 
population who would be considered pathological gamers is relatively small (around 
7 to 9%), therefore targeted recruitment of these individuals (or a very large sample 
as in Study 1) may be necessary to detect differences associated with pathological 
gaming.   
Study 1 also revealed a positive relationship between pathological gaming, 
risky decision making, and sensitivity to feedback. Pathological gamers, particularly 
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those who also reported more screen time, made riskier choices and continued to do 
so even after it became clear these choices were not advantageous (e.g., point 
totals fell into negative values). This suggests that these individuals were more 
willing to accept risk, but it does not immediately reveal why this would be the case. 
Evidence in the alcohol literature has demonstrated that individuals with a greater 
likelihood of becoming alcoholics reported less negative affect to errors on a task, 
suggesting that insensitivity to the negative consequences of their actions may be 
one pathway by which use of a substance becomes abuse (Bartholow, Henry, Lust, 
Saults, & Wood, 2012). The data from Study 1 indicate that this may also be true for 
pathological video game use, as pathology was related to reduced sensitivity to 
negative feedback. Further research will be essential for determining the role of 
differential sensitivity to feedback in the development of pathological behaviors (e.g., 
video game use, alcohol, gambling).  
In contrast to Study 1, Study 2 did not reveal reduced sensitivity to negative 
feedback among the high gamers in the risk task or probabilistic selection task. 
Individuals were not recruited by pathological gaming status and this may have 
limited the ability to replicate the associations established in Study 1. Further 
analyses of this data that consider pathological symptoms are being conducted and 
preliminary results indicate that individuals with pathological symptoms do show 
evidence of reduced sensitivity to negative feedback (Bailey, 2012). Pathological 
gaming is a promising avenue for future research and this work will be essential for 
the identification of risk factors and development of successful interventions. 
Summary 
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The data from the current studies provide some support for the hypothesis 
that exposure to video games is associated with differences in risky decision making 
outside of the gaming environment. Study 1 demonstrated a relationship between 
video game experience and differences in sensitivity to negative feedback and risky 
decisions that may vary by game genre and the presence of symptoms related to 
pathological gaming. Study 2 demonstrated that video game experience was 
associated with differences in the evaluative categorization of negative outcomes, 
providing a possible explanation for the behavioral differences identified in Study 1. 
Study 3 failed to establish a causal relationship between short-term exposure to 
video games and differences in risky decision making. These data indicate many 
possible directions for future research that could provide a better understanding of 
the relationship between video game experience and risky decision making. Further 
examination of game genre and pathological gaming may be particularly useful in 
determining when video game experience may be most strongly related to 
insensitivity to negative feedback and riskier decision making. 
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APPENDIX A. MEDIA USAGE QUESTIONNAIRE 
On a typical school day (Monday through Friday), for how many hours do you play video 
games during each of the following times?  
1.  6 AM – Noon _____ 
2.  Noon - 6 PM _____ 
3.  6 PM – Midnight _____ 
4.  Midnight - 6 AM _____ 
 
On a typical weekend day (Saturday or Sunday), for how many hours do you play video 
games during each of the following times?  
5.  6 AM – Noon _____ 
6.  Noon - 6 PM _____ 
7.  6 PM – Midnight _____ 
8.  Midnight - 6 AM _____ 
 
How often do you play each of the following genres of video games? 
1: I never play it 
2: I rarely play it 
3: I occasionally play it 
4: I sometimes play it 
5: I often play it 
6: I always play it 
 
9. _______ Sports (Madden NFL, NBA) 
10. _______ Action/Adventure (Assassin’s Creed, Prince of Persia, Tomb Raider) 
11. _______ Puzzle Games (Super Monkey Ball, Bejeweled, Tetris) 
12. _______ Fighting Games (Street Fighter IV, Soul Calibur, Mortal Kombat) 
13. _______ First-person Shooters (Halo, Unreal Tournament, Call of Duty) 
14. _______ Third-person Shooters (Gears of War, Grand Theft Auto) 
15. _______ Strategy (Starcraft, Civilization) 
16. _______ Simulation (Flight Simulator, Sim City) 
17. _______ Music & Party (Dance Dance Revolution, Rock Band) 
18. _______ Single-player Roleplaying Game (Diablo 2, Final Fantasy XII, Dragon Age) 
19. _______ Real World Massively Multiplayer Online Game (Second Life) 
20. _______ Massively Multiplayer Online Roleplaying Game (World of Warcraft, Guild 
Wars) 
 
21. What video game do you play most often? _______________________ 
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APPENDIX B. PATHOLOGICAL GAMING SCALE 
Please answer the following questions by circling Y (yes), N (no), S (sometimes), or 
DK (don’t know). 
1. In the past year, have you played video games as a way of escaping from problems or 
bad feelings?          Y        N          S             DK 
2. In the past year, have you become restless or irritable when attempting to cut down or 
stop playing video games?       Y        N          S             DK 
3. In the past year, have you ever done poorly on a school assignment or test because you 
spent too much time playing video games?     Y        N          S             DK 
4. In the past year, have you needed to spend more and more time and/or money on video 
games in order to achieve the desired excitement?     Y        N          S             DK 
5. In the past year, have you become more preoccupied with playing video games, studying 
video game playing, or planning the next opportunity to 
play?              Y        N          S             DK 
6. In the past year, have you ever lied to family or friends about how much you play video 
games?    Y        N          S             DK 
7. In the past year, have you ever neglected household chores to spend more time playing 
video games? Y        N          S             DK 
8. In the past year, have you ever committed illegal/unsocial acts such as theft from family, 
friends, or elsewhere in order to get video games?    Y        N          S             DK 
9. In the past year, have you ever needed friends or family to help you financially because 
you spent too much money on video game equipment, software, or game/Internet 
fees?     Y        N          S             DK 
10.  In the past year, have you often spent more money than you could afford on video 
games?           Y        N          S             DK 
11. In the past year, has your work ever suffered (e.g., postponing things, missing 
deadlines, being too tired to function well, etc.) because you spent too much time playing 
video games?                          Y        N          S             DK 
12. Do you sometimes try to limit your own playing?                       
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APPENDIX C. BARRATT IMPULSIVENESS SCALE 
DIRECTIONS: People differ in the ways they act and think in different situations.  This is a 
test to measure some of the ways in which you act and think.  Read each statement and put 
an X on the appropriate circle on the right side of this page.  Do not spend too much time on 
any statement.  Answer quickly and honestly. 
 
          О   О             О        О 
 Rarely/Never     Occasionally   Often  Almost Always/Always 
1    I plan tasks carefully.    О      О      О      О 
2    I do things without thinking.    О      О      О      О 
3    I make-up my mind quickly.    О      О      О      О 
4    I am happy-go-lucky.    О      О      О      О 
5    I don’t “pay attention.”    О      О      О      О 
6    I have “racing” thoughts.    О      О      О      О 
7    I plan trips well ahead of time.    О      О      О      О 
8    I am self controlled.    О      О      О      О 
9    I concentrate easily.    О      О      О      О 
10  I save regularly.    О      О      О      О 
11  I “squirm” at plays or lectures.    О      О      О      О 
12  I am a careful thinker.    О      О      О      О 
13  I plan for job security.    О      О      О      О 
14  I say things without thinking.    О      О      О      О 
15  I like to think about complex problems.    О      О      О      О 
16  I change jobs.    О      О      О      О 
17  I act “on impulse.”    О      О      О      О 
18  I get easily bored when solving thought problems.    О      О      О      О 
19  I act on the spur of the moment.    О      О      О      О 
20  I am a steady thinker.    О      О      О      О 
21  I change residences.    О      О      О      О 
22  I buy things on impulse.    О      О      О      О 
23  I can only think about one thing at a time.    О      О      О      О 
24  I change hobbies.    О      О      О      О 
25  I spend or charge more than I earn.    О      О      О      О 
26  I often have extraneous thoughts when thinking.    О      О      О      О 
27  I am more interested in the present than the future.    О      О      О      О 
28  I am restless at the theater or lectures.    О      О      О      О 
29  I like puzzles.    О      О      О      О 
30  I am future oriented.    О      О      О      О 
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APPENDIX D. RISK-ATTITUDES SCALE 
For each of the following statements, please indicate your likelihood of engaging in each 
activity or behavior. 
Provide a rating from 1 to 5, using the following scale: 
 
  1            2   3        4              5 
    Very unlikely            Unlikely             Not sure                Likely               Very likely 
 
1. Going camping in the wilderness, beyond the civilization of a campground. (R) _______ 
2. Betting a day’s income at the horse races. (G) _______ 
3. Cheating on an exam. (E) _______ 
4. Chasing a tornado or hurricane by car to take dramatic photos. (R) _______ 
5. Cheating by a significant amount on your income tax return. (E) _______ 
6. Betting a day’s income at a high stake poker game. (G) _______ 
7. Having an affair with a married man or woman. (E) _______ 
8. Forging somebody’s signature. (E) _______ 
9. Passing off somebody else’s work as your own. (E) _______ 
10. Going on a vacation in a third-world country without prearranged travel and hotel 
accommodations. (R) _______ 
11. Going down a ski run that is beyond your ability or closed. (R) _______ 
12. Illegally copying a piece of software. (E) _______ 
13. Going whitewater rafting during rapid water flows in the spring. (R) _______ 
14. Betting a day’s income on the outcome of a sporting event (e.g. baseball, 
soccer, or football). (G) _______ 
15. Shoplifting a small item (e.g. a lipstick or a pen). (E) _______ 
16. Stealing an additional TV cable connection off the one you pay for. (E) _______ 
17. Periodically engaging in a dangerous sport (e.g. mountain climbing or sky diving). 
(R)_______ 
18. Gambling a week’s income at a casino. (G) _______ 
19. Trying out bungee jumping at least once. (R) _______ 
20. Piloting your own small plane, if you could. (R) _______ 
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APPENDIX E. VIDEO GAME EVALUATION 
VIDEO GAME EVALUATION 
Game Name:_____________________________ Game #:______       Subject 
ID:__________ 
Please answer the following questions about the video game you played today. To ensure 
confidentiality, please do not write your name or student ID on the sheet. 
**************************************************************************************************** 
Please read each of the following statements and indicate your agreement with each 
(circle a number): 
1. The game was action packed.     Strongly Disagree: 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 :Strongly Agree 
2. The game was entertaining.        Strongly Disagree: 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 :Strongly Agree 
3. The game was exciting.            Strongly Disagree: 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 :Strongly Agree 
4. The game was frustrating.           Strongly Disagree: 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 :Strongly Agree 
5. The game was fun.                     Strongly Disagree: 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 :Strongly Agree 
6. The game was boring.           Strongly Disagree: 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 :Strongly Agree 
7. The game was violent.           Strongly Disagree: 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 :Strongly Agree 
8. The game was difficult to play.   Strongly Disagree: 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 :Strongly Agree 
9. The game was absorbing.           Strongly Disagree: 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 :Strongly Agree 
10. The game was arousing.           Strongly Disagree: 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 :Strongly Agree 
11. The game was enjoyable.         Strongly Disagree: 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 :Strongly Agree 
12. The game was involving.           Strongly Disagree: 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 :Strongly Agree 
13. The game was stimulating.       Strongly Disagree: 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 :Strongly Agree 
14. The game was addicting.         Strongly Disagree: 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 :Strongly Agree 
**************************************************************************************************** 
Have you played this video game before? (circle one)  YES  NO 
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APPENDIX F. BRIEF HANDEDNESS INVENTORY 
Participant ID#: _____________ 
 
Have you ever had any tendency to left-handedness?  YES  NO 
 
Please indicate your preferences in the use of hands in the following activities by putting + in the 
appropriate column.  Where the preference is so strong that you would never try to use the other 
hand unless absolutely forced to, put ++.  If in any case you are really indifferent, put + in both 
columns. 
 
Some of the activities require both hands.  In these cases, the part of the task or object, for which 
hand-preferences is wanted is indicated in brackets. 
 
Please try to answer all the questions, and only leave a blank if you have no experience at all with the 
object or task. 
 
  Right  Left 
 
1. Writing 
 
2. Drawing 
 
3. Throwing 
 
4. Scissors 
 
5. Toothbrush 
 
6. Knife (without fork) 
 
7. Spoon 
 
8. Broom (upper hand) 
 
9. Striking Match (match) 
 
10. Opening Box 
 
Total 
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APPENDIX G. INFORMED CONSENT DOCUMENTS 
INFORMED CONSENT DOCUMENT 
 
Title of Study: Decision Making and Media 
 
Investigators: Robert West, Kira Bailey, Brandy Tiernan, Ashley Scolaro, Brandt 
Uitermarkt, Cassandra Anglade, Michelle Farrington, Judson Kuffel, 
Justin Rhode, Mollie Tiernan, Emmanuel Ukpan 
  
This is a research study. Please take your time in deciding if you would like to participate. 
Please feel free to ask questions at any time. 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this study is to examine cognitive processes involved in decision making. 
You are eligible to participate in this project as part of the Department of Psychology 
Research participation pool. As noted on your course syllabus, participation in experiments is 
one of the available options for acquiring experimental credit in your psychology course. 
DESCRIPTION OF PROCEDURES 
If you agree to participate, you will be asked to complete 5 brief questionnaires measuring 
emotion, media usage, and decision making. You will also complete 8 tasks on the computer 
which will measure attention and decision making. These tasks will be explained and any 
questions you have will be answered. The entire experiment should take approximately 120 
minutes. 
 
RISKS 
There are no known risks associated with performing the computer tasks. Stimuli will be 
cards, shapes, or words. 
BENEFITS 
If you decide to participate in this study there will be no direct benefit to you. It is hoped that 
the information gained in this study will benefit society by extending our understanding of 
the relationship between prior video game experience, attention, and decision making.  
ALTERNATIVES TO PARTICIPATION 
Alternatives other than research participation for earning research/extra credit are described 
in your course syllabus. 
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COSTS AND COMPENSATION 
You will not have any costs from participating in this study. You will be compensated for 
participating in this study by earning 3 course credits. 
PARTICIPANT RIGHTS 
Your participation in this study is completely voluntary and you may refuse to participate or 
leave the study at any time. If you decide to not participate in the study or leave the study 
early, it will not result in any penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. 
You can skip any questions that you do not wish to answer. 
 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
Records identifying participants will be kept confidential to the extent permitted by 
applicable laws and regulations and will not be made publicly available. However, federal 
government regulatory agencies auditing departments of Iowa State University, and the 
Institutional Review Board (a committee that reviews and approves human subject research 
studies) may inspect and/or copy your records for quality assurance and data analysis. These 
records may contain private information. We are required by the University IRB to keep a 
copy of the informed consent. 
 
To ensure confidentiality to the extent permitted by law, the following measures will be 
taken: The electronic data will be stored on a password-protected computer that is in the 
experimenters’ laboratory. Only the investigators have access to this computer. The consent 
form will be separated from the other data following the completion of data collection and 
maintained in a locked file cabinet so that there is no way to link the identity of the individual 
to the written or electronic data. The data collected in this research will be used for scientific 
purposes and may be presented at scientific meetings or published in professional journals. If 
the results are published, your identity will remain confidential. 
 
QUESTIONS OR PROBLEMS 
You are encouraged to ask questions at any time during this study.   
 For further information about the study contact Dr. Robert West, rwest@iastate.edu. 
 If you have any questions about the rights of research subjects or research-related 
injury, please contact the IRB Administrator, (515) 294-4566, IRB@iastate.edu, or 
Director, (515) 294-3115, Office for Responsible Research, Iowa State University, 
Ames, Iowa 50011.  
 
***************************************************************************
*** 
 
PARTICIPANT SIGNATURE 
Your signature indicates that you voluntarily agree to participate in this study, that the study 
has been explained to you, that you have been given the time to read the document, and that 
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your questions have been satisfactorily answered. You will receive a copy of the written 
informed consent prior to your participation in the study.  
 
 
Participant’s Name (printed)               
    
             
(Participant’s Signature)     (Date)  
 
 
INVESTIGATOR STATEMENT – I certify that the participant has been given adequate 
time to read and learn about the study and all of their questions have been answered. It is my 
opinion that the participant understand the purpose, risks, benefits, and procedures that will 
be followed in this study and has voluntarily agree to participate. 
    
             
(Signature of Person Obtaining Informed Consent)  (Date)  
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INFORMED CONSENT DOCUMENT 
 
Title of Study: Media Effects on the Neural Correlates of Decision Making 
 
Investigators: Robert West, PhD 
Kira Bailey, MS 
  
This is a research study. Please take your time in deciding if you would like to participate. 
Please feel free to ask questions at any time. 
 
INTRODUCTION- The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between prior 
media exposure and brain processes involved in decision making. You are eligible to 
participate in this project as part of the Department of Psychology Research participation 
pool. As noted on your course syllabus, participation in experiments is one of the available 
options for acquiring experimental credit in your psychology course. 
 
DESCRIPTION OF PROCEDURES - You will be asked to perform four tasks that 
examine decision making while we record EEG (brain waves) from your scalp. In order to 
record the EEG you will wear a cap that contains the electrodes. In each of the electrodes we 
will place a small quantity of conductive gel. This gel is water based and is easy to wash out 
of your hair at the end of the study. The tasks, which will be presented on the computer, will 
be explained and any questions that you have will be answered. Before beginning the 
computer tasks you will complete six questionnaires measuring handedness, emotion, media 
usage, and decision making.  The entire experiment should take less than 2 hours. 
 
RISKS - There are no known risks associated with performing the computer tasks.  Stimuli 
will be shapes, card, or words. There is a slight risk of developing a headache while wearing 
the Electro-cap. This goes away after the cap is removed. If this occurs during the study let 
us know and we can take steps to eliminate the discomfort. There is also a slight risk related 
to the transmission of pathogens (bacteria or viruses) related to wearing the Electro-cap.  
This risk of transmission is greatly reduced by disinfecting the caps following each use with 
a medical grade disinfectant. 
 
BENEFITS- If you decide to participate in this study there will be no direct benefit to you. It 
is hoped that the information gained in this study will benefit society by extending our 
understanding of the relationship between prior video game experience, attention, and 
decision making.  
 
ALTERNATIVES TO PARTICIPATION- Alternatives other than research participation 
for earning research/extra credit are described in your course syllabus. 
 
COSTS AND COMPENSATION- You will not have any costs from participating in this 
study. You will be compensated for participating in this study by earning 3 course credits. 
PARTICIPANT RIGHTS- Your participation in this study is completely voluntary and you 
may refuse to participate or leave the study at any time. If you decide to not participate in the 
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study or leave the study early, it will not result in any penalty or loss of benefits to which you 
are otherwise entitled. You can skip any questions that you do not wish to answer. 
CONFIDENTIALITY- Records identifying participants will be kept confidential to the 
extent permitted by applicable laws and regulations and will not be made publicly available. 
However, federal government regulatory agencies auditing departments of Iowa State 
University and the Institutional Review Board (a committee that reviews and approves 
human subject research studies) may inspect and/or copy your records for quality assurance 
and data analysis. These records may contain private information. We are required by the 
University IRB to keep a copy of the informed consent. 
To ensure confidentiality to the extent permitted by law, the following measures will be 
taken: The electronic data will be stored on a password-protected computer that is in the 
experimenters’ laboratory. Only the investigators have access to this computer. The consent 
form will be separated from the other data following the completion of data collection and 
maintained in a locked file cabinet so that there is no way to link the identity of the individual 
to the written or electronic data. The data collected in this research will be used for scientific 
purposes and may be presented at scientific meetings or published in professional journals. If 
the results are published, your identity will remain confidential. 
 
QUESTIONS OR PROBLEMS- You are encouraged to ask questions at any time during 
this study.   
 For further information about the study contact Robert West, rwest@iastate.edu. 
 If you have any questions about the rights of research subjects or research-related 
injury, please contact the IRB Administrator, (515) 294-4566, IRB@iastate.edu, or 
Director, (515) 294-3115, Office for Responsible Research, Iowa State University, 
Ames, Iowa 50011.  
***************************************************************************
*** 
PARTICIPANT SIGNATURE 
Your signature indicates that you voluntarily agree to participate in this study, that the study 
has been explained to you, that you have been given the time to read the document, and that 
your questions have been satisfactorily answered. You will receive a copy of the written 
informed consent prior to your participation in the study.  
 
Participant’s Name (printed)               
    
             
(Participant’s Signature)     (Date)  
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INVESTIGATOR STATEMENT – I certify that the participant has been given adequate 
time to read and learn about the study and all of their questions have been answered. It is my 
opinion that the participant understand the purpose, risks, benefits, and procedures that will 
be followed in this study and has voluntarily agree to participate. 
             
(Signature of Person Obtaining Informed Consent)  (Date)  
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INFORMED CONSENT DOCUMENT 
 
Title of Study: Video Games and Decision Making 
 
Investigators: Robert West, PhD  
Kira Bailey, MS 
  
This is a research study. Please take your time in deciding if you would like to participate. 
Please feel free to ask questions at any time. 
INTRODUCTION- The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of playing a video 
game on the cognitive processes involved in decision making. You are eligible to participate 
in this project as part of the Department of Psychology Research participation pool. As noted 
on your course syllabus, participation in experiments is one of the available options for 
acquiring experimental credit in your psychology course. 
DESCRIPTION OF PROCEDURES- If you agree to participate, you will be asked to 
complete 4 brief questionnaires on emotion, impulsivity, and media usage. Then you will 
play one of four video games for 20 minutes after which you will perform 2 computer tasks 
that examine decision making. The video games may contain violent content and have a 
rating of M for Mature. The tasks will require you to make some decisions about stimuli, 
which will be cards, shapes, and words. The entire study will take approximately 50 minutes 
to complete.  
RISKS- The video game may contain violent content which you may find disturbing. If you 
feel uncomfortable at any point, you should inform the experimenter and they will turn the 
game off. There are no known risks associated with performing the computer tasks. Stimuli 
will be cards, shapes, or words. 
BENEFITS- If you decide to participate in this study there will be no direct benefit to you. It 
is hoped that the information gained in this study will benefit society by extending our 
understanding of the relationship between prior video game experience, attention, and 
decision making.  
ALTERNATIVES TO PARTICIPATION- Alternatives other than research participation 
for earning research/extra credit are described in your course syllabus. 
COSTS AND COMPENSATION- You will not have any costs from participating in this 
study. You will be compensated for participating in this study by earning 1 course credit. 
PARTICIPANT RIGHTS- Your participation in this study is completely voluntary and you 
may refuse to participate or leave the study at any time. If you decide to not participate in the 
study or leave the study early, it will not result in any penalty or loss of benefits to which you 
are otherwise entitled. You can skip any questions that you do not wish to answer. 
CONFIDENTIALITY- Records identifying participants will be kept confidential to the 
extent permitted by applicable laws and regulations and will not be made publicly available. 
However, federal government regulatory agencies auditing departments of Iowa State 
University, and the Institutional Review Board (a committee that reviews and approves 
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human subject research studies) may inspect and/or copy your records for quality assurance 
and data analysis. These records may contain private information. We are required by the 
University IRB to keep a copy of the informed consent. 
To ensure confidentiality to the extent permitted by law, the following measures will be 
taken: The electronic data will be stored on a password-protected computer that is in the 
experimenters’ laboratory. Only the investigators have access to this computer. The consent 
form will be separated from the other data following the completion of data collection and 
maintained in a locked file cabinet so that there is no way to link the identity of the individual 
to the written or electronic data. The data collected in this research will be used for scientific 
purposes and may be presented at scientific meetings or published in professional journals. If 
the results are published, your identity will remain confidential. 
 
QUESTIONS OR PROBLEMS- You are encouraged to ask questions at any time during 
this study.   
 For further information about the study contact Robert West, rwest@iastate.edu. 
 If you have any questions about the rights of research subjects or research-related 
injury, please contact the IRB Administrator, (515) 294-4566, IRB@iastate.edu, or 
Director, (515) 294-3115, Office for Responsible Research, Iowa State University, 
Ames, Iowa 50011.  
***************************************************************************
*** 
PARTICIPANT SIGNATURE 
Your signature indicates that you voluntarily agree to participate in this study, that the study 
has been explained to you, that you have been given the time to read the document, and that 
your questions have been satisfactorily answered. You will receive a copy of the written 
informed consent prior to your participation in the study.  
 
 
Participant’s Name (printed)               
    
             
(Participant’s Signature)     (Date)  
 
 
INVESTIGATOR STATEMENT – I certify that the participant has been given adequate 
time to read and learn about the study and all of their questions have been answered. It is my 
opinion that the participant understand the purpose, risks, benefits, and procedures that will 
be followed in this study and has voluntarily agree to participate. 
    
             
(Signature of Person Obtaining Informed Consent)  (Date)  
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